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Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB: A Challenge to the Appointments Clause and 
 its Ramifications to Corporate Governance 
 
Todd B. Skelton* 
 
In the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which established the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) to protect investors in publicly traded 
companies and to promote fair, independent audits of such companies based upon 
auditing standards promulgated by the PCAOB.  The PCAOB, whose members 
are appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), exercises 
investigatory and disciplinary powers in overseeing public company audits.  My 
study examines (1) the pending United States Supreme Court case, Free 
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, in which petitioners allege that vesting the 
appointment of the PCAOB in the SEC rather than in the President violates the 
U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause by effectively removing the President’s 
control over an independent agency and (2) the significant effects that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in the case will have on public companies and auditing 
firms by either confirming the PCAOB’s investigatory and enforcement powers or 
invalidating a significant accounting and corporate governance reform. 
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I. Introduction 
 Independent agencies have become a well-known and integral part of the governmental 
framework in the United States.  This “Fourth Branch” has become increasingly popular in the 
seventy years that have passed since the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), as evidenced by the growth in the number and 
authority of administrative agencies during and since the New Deal Era.  The government-by-
administrative-agency model has been further supplemented by industry self-regulation, as seen 
in the accounting industry.  The Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB case that is examined in this 
paper presents a constitutional challenge to this schema.  Many scholars have written about the 
U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause, regulation by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (the “PCAOB”) and independent agencies.  This paper extends that scholarship 
by laying out the regulatory framework prior to and following the enactment by Congress of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, analyzes the constitutional implications of the Free Enterprise 
Fund case, and identifies and explores several issues that may potentially arise from the Court’s 
decision in the case.1 
II. Background 
 This section will explore the creation of the regulatory framework for public companies 
and the accounting profession in use by the United States today.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”) is the independent agency charged with protecting 
investors and regulating the securities market in the United States.2  Its roots trace back to the 
                                                
1 There is a growing body of literature about the PCAOB.  E.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Presidential Control of the 
Elite “Non-Agency,” 88 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2010); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The 
PCAOB and its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005); Michael A. Thomason, Jr., Auditing the 
PCAOB:  A Test to the Accountability of the Uniquely Structured Regulator of Accountants, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1952 
(2009).  This article examines the Free Enterprise Fund case now pending before the United States Supreme Court 
and the potential implications of the Court’s decision in the case. 
2 Securities and Exchange Commission, What We Do, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml  
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New Deal Era.  The history of the Securities and Exchange Commission and auditing standards 
will be laid out to preface the current regulatory environment.  Accounting scandals, such as 
those at Enron and WorldCom, precipitated the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”),3 which has reformed corporate governance and accounting.  Additionally, SOX created 
the PCAOB (or “Board”), which changed the regulatory environment for the auditors of public 
companies. 
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
The SEC is a disclosure-enforcing agency.4 The SEC has broad jurisdiction and is 
charged with interpreting and enforcing the securities laws of the United States.5  The federal 
securities laws and some related laws include:  the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”),6 the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,7 the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,8 the Trust 
Indenture Act of 1939,9 Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as added by the Chandler Act 
of 1938,10 the Investment Company Act of 1940,11 the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,12 the 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,13 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,14 all as amended.  
                                                
3 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
4 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 561 (rev. ed. 1995); see SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD 
ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 27 (1981).  “Full disclosure is based on a theory that investors will 
make more informed investment decisions if management is forced to disclose all ‘material’ information about its 
company.” JERRY M. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS:  FROM ENRON TO 
REFORM 143 (2006). 
5 The securities laws listed here are federal statutes. The United States is unique in that corporate law is primarily a 
state function.  ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW (2 ed.) (2004).  
6 15 U.S.C. § 77. 
7 15 U.S.C. § 78. 
8 15 U.S.C. § 79. 
9 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa (publicly traded debt securities are issued only under an SEC-approved trust indenture with an 
appointed trustee). 
10 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (SEC acts as an advisor to the courts or party in a bankruptcy proceeding); see Joseph L. 
Weiner, Special Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at United Federal Workers of America: Functions of the 
SEC Under the Chandler Act (Nov. 30, 1938).  
11 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1-80a-52. 
12 15 U.S.C. § 80b (in conjunction with Investment Company Act, supra, these two acts cover the registration and 
disclosure of investment companies and advisers and regulate these entities). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa. 
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Generally, the 1933 and 1934 statutes require registration for any security that can be sold to the 
public and mandate corporate disclosure.  These responsibilities are only a fraction of the 
mandate the SEC fulfills today.  
1. The Creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Before the Great Depression, Wall Street was self-regulating.  As the American legal 
historian Lawrence Friedman has noted, 
The New York Stock Exchange ran its own (private) system of securities 
regulation.  Any company that wanted to list stock on the exchange had to file 
financial information, and provide [an] independent legal opinion, about the 
company and its securities.  But companies could get around these requirements 
by registering stock on some other exchange.  The New York Stock Exchange 
itself never had enough staff to double-check the information; many companies 
engaged in creative bookkeeping and accounting—which the stock exchange was 
powerless to detect.15 
 
Subsequent to the 1929 stock market crash,16 the United States government became 
interested in the regulation of Wall Street.  Much of the initial focus under the Hoover 
administration centered on short-selling and curbing speculation.17  Ferdinand Pecora, counsel to 
the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, however, spearheaded an investigation in 1933-
1934 into the nation’s financial institutions.  In this investigation, hearings focusing on the 
National City Bank garnered much public attention.  Bank executives had incorporated National 
City Company in 1911 to skirt existing banking restrictions aimed at dividing traditional 
commercial bank practices from riskier investment banking practices.18  As a result of the Pecora 
investigation, public opinion toward bankers plummeted,19 and newly inaugurated President 
                                                
14 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 3. 
15 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 164 (2002). 
16 For a discussion of the 1929 crash, see JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (50th anniv. ed., 1979) 
(1954). 
17 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 3, 5. 
18 Id. at 23-24. For an account of the Pecora hearings, see ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT:  
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 434-439 (1959).  
19 See id. at 29. 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt furthered the rancorous attitude against financial institutions.20  After 
expanding the Banking Committee’s authority in its financial practices hearings,21 Pecora 
brought J.P. Morgan and Company under scrutiny.  This relentless investigation was the basis for 
the passage of the Banking Act of 1933, 22 and the Pecora hearings, as a whole, influenced the 
passage of the 1933 Act.23  There was, however, much more to the creation and passage of the 
1933 Act. 
 Prior to the passage of the final version of the 1933 Act, two versions had existed.  The 
first, proposed by Samuel Untermyer at the request of Raymond Moley,24 would have vested in 
the Postmaster General the authority to regulate stock exchanges, securities, and financial 
statements.25  President Roosevelt, among others, was reluctant to have the Post Office 
Department oversee stock exchanges and accounting and created another team to draft a 
securities reform bill.26  This new, second bill, drafted largely by Huston Thompson, a former 
                                                
20 See The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 2, p. 12, available at 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ppotpus&cc=ppotpus&type=bib&q1=roosevelt% 
2C+franklin&rgn1=author&Submit=Search. 
21 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1933, at 1. 
22 Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933); see SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 38. 
23 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
24 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 51. Moley, an Assistant Secretary of State and former Barnard College professor at 
Columbia University, was an important, “[e]ssentially . . . conservative” member of Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust” who 
later broke with FDR and became an opponent of New Deal reform.  JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT:  THE 
LION AND THE FOX 153 (1956); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:  A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 59, 107, 
201 (1990); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932–1940 at 32 (1963).  
Untermyer has been described as a “crotchety” lawyer who was “notable for his struggles on behalf of insurance 
company stockholders and against J. P. Morgan and the trusts.”  JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT:  FDR’S 
HUNDRED DAYS AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE 278 (2006); FREIDEL, FDR, supra, at 19. 
25 R. MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 177 (1939). 
26 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 52.  The unorthodox administrative practice of giving his assistants overlapping 
assignments of the same task was a favorite of Roosevelt’s.  See ALTER, supra note 24, at 278; BURNS, supra note 
24, at 371-374; FREIDEL, supra, note 24, at 84, 120-121; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 328; SCHLESINGER, 
supra note 18, at 535 (new agencies created with jurisdictions that overlapped each other and spilled into cabinet 
departments).  At the agency level, fierce internal conflicts occasionally resulted from the President’s delegation of 
power “so loosely that bureaucrats found themselves entangled in lines of authority and stepping on one another’s 
toes,” but, as the historian James MacGregor Burns has observed, 
 
 The main reason for Roosevelt’s methods . . . involved a tenacious effort to keep control 
of the executive branch in the face of the centrifugal forces of the American political system.  By 
establishing in an agency one power center that counteracted another, he made each official more 
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chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”), proposed giving power to the FTC to 
oversee securities regulation.  As one student of the Roosevelt presidency has noted, “[t]he 
fundamental feature of the Thompson bill was disclosure, forbidding the sale of securities not 
registered with the FTC.  The bill made no effort to analyze the quality of stock issues or to 
protect consumers from weak or fraudulent ones.”27  There were problems, however, with the 
Thompson bill as well, primarily centering on its proposal to expand the power of the FTC to 
rescind the registration of an issuer and its strict liability provisions.28  Roosevelt agreed with the 
chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Rep. Sam Rayburn (D-
TX), that the bill was overly burdensome and brought in yet a third drafting team.29   
This team, led by Felix Frankfurter,30 a proponent of “government-by-administrative-
agency,”31 swiftly prepared a securities reform bill that remedied the deficiencies of the 
Thompson proposal and that could pass.  Frankfurter’s proposal continued to utilize the FTC as 
the responsible securities regulatory agency and became known as the Landis-Cohen draft, after 
                                                
dependent on White House support; the President in effect became the necessary ally and partner 
of each.  He lessened bureaucratic tendencies toward self-aggrandizement; he curbed any attempt 
to gang up on him.  He was, in effect, adapting the old method of divide and conquer to his own 
purposes. 
 
 The problem, from Roosevelt’s standpoint, was one of power rather than of narrow 
efficiency.  His technique was curiously like that of Joseph Stalin, who used the overlapping 
delegation of function, a close student of his methods has said, to prevent “any single chain of 
command from making major decisions without confronting other arms of the state’s bureaucracy 
and thus bringing the issues into the open at a high level.”  Roosevelt, like Stalin, was a political 
administrator in the sense that his first concern was power—albeit for very different ends. 
 
BURNS, supra note 24, at 371, 373. 
27 GEORGE MCJIMSEY, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 42 (2000). 
28 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 56. 
29 Id. Rayburn had “crusaded for tough securities regulation since his days as a young congressman under Woodrow 
Wilson.”  MCJIMSEY, supra note 27, at 41. 
30 Felix Frankfurter, a friend of Roosevelt’s since the Wilson Administration, was a prolific faculty member at 
Harvard Law School who became a confidant of President Roosevelt’s.  For the lengthy relationship between 
Frankfurter and FDR, see ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER:  THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928–1945 (Max Freedman 
annot., 1967).  Frankfurter turned down Roosevelt’s offer of an appointment as Solicitor General and was later 
appointed by Roosevelt to the United States Supreme Court in 1939.  SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 58. 
31 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 62. 
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Frankfurter’s assistants, James M. Landis and Benjamin V. Cohen.32  Their bill “broadened 
liability to underwriters, distributors, and brokers instead of concentrating it on corporation 
executives.”33 Congressman Rayburn introduced the Lanis-Cohen draft, and the measure quickly 
passed the House with little debate.  The Senate, however, still preferred the Thompson proposal, 
and the two different bills ended up in a conference committee.34  Ultimately, using the House 
version as its basis, the conference committee reached a compromise that both houses passed.  
As enacted, however, the Securities Act of 1933 designated the FTC as the authoritative body to 
regulate securities. 35  The new statute was, in a summary offered by Lawrence Friedman, 
in fact essentially a disclosure law.  People who sold securities had to register 
them with the Federal Trade Commission.  They had to disclose a wealth of 
information about the securities, the underwriters, and the issuing company, 
including balance sheets and profit-and-loss statements.  Any prospectus dangled 
before the public also had to contain much of this information.36  
 
The Securities Act of 1933 was controversial from its inception, and the process of revising the 
measure began almost immediately.   
The stock exchanges, various Congressional committees, and even the Frankfurter team 
were involved in the revision process.  By this time, Landis had been appointed to the FTC to 
administer the 1933 Act.37  A version known as the Fletcher-Rayburn38 bill was hotly debated 
and went through several amendments.39  The most relevant to this discussion was an 
amendment in the Senate Banking Committee by Sen. Carter Glass (D-VA) to “replace the 
                                                
32 Landis and Cohen, along with Thomas G. Corcoran, were selected by Frankfurter to assist in drafting the 
securities legislation.  All were colleagues of Frankfurter’s at Harvard Law School.  SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 61-
63. 
33 MCJIMSEY, supra note 27, at 42. 
34 James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 41 (1959-
1960). 
35 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 70. 
36 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 164-165. 
37 Federal Trade Commission, Oral Histories, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/oralhistory.shtm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2010); SCHLESINGE, supra note 18, at 442. 
38 Congressman Rayburn, supra, and Sen. Duncan U. Fletcher (D-FL), chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, 
which had conducted the Pecora hearings. 
39 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 96-97. 
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Federal Trade Commission and Federal Reserve Board as enforcement agencies with a new 
three-person Securities Exchange Commission.”40  The rationale for transferring such 
enforcement power from the FTC and the Federal Reserve Board to the proposed SEC was 
addressed by Sen. Glass in a statement on the Senate floor in May of 1934 and in article by the 
senator that appeared in the New York Times in April of that year.  In his remarks on the Senate 
floor, Sen. Glass noted: 
It ought to be borne in mind that the Federal Trade Commission was not picked 
by the President—for it is composed of a membership appointed by various 
Presidents—nor confirmed by the Senate with the idea of its being charged with 
the extremely complex and important duties which will devolve upon the special 
commission [the SEC] provided for by the pending bill.  I doubt whether the 
members of the Federal Trade Commission know anything in the world about 
stock-exchange transactions, unless some one or more of them may have been 
stock speculators or brokers on the stock exchange.41 
 
In the article that appeared in the New York Times, Sen. Glass wrote: 
 . . . I very decidedly object to having the Federal Reserve System allied or 
aligned in any way with Stock Exchange transactions.  The Federal Reserve Act 
textually prohibits the Federal Reserve Board from including Stock Exchange 
securities as collateral for rediscount at Federal Reserve Banks, and it was the 
original purpose of Congress, which has been maintained to this day, to keep the 
Federal Reserve System as far away from the Stock Exchange transactions as 
possible. 
 
 The Federal Reserve Board has its hands full ordinarily to manage the 
credits of the commercial banks which are members of the system, and the 
attention of the board should not be diverted to other things which are foreign to 
commercial banking and with which the Federal Reserve Board is not supposed to 
have familiarity. 
 
 The same is true with respect to the Federal Trade Commission, the 
statutory functions of which have nothing to do with Stock Exchange transactions 
and the members of which are not supposed to have familiarity with such 
transactions.42 
                                                
40 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 97.  
41 Remarks of Sen. Carter Class, U.S. Senate, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., May 8, 1934, 78 CONG. REC. 8,286 (1934).  
Apparently even the FTC’s Landis favored a new enforcement agency.  SCHLESINGER, NEW DEAL at 466. 
42 Carter Glass, New Market Bill Praised by Glass, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1934, at N11.  See also Committee Trims 
the Exchange Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1934, at 1. 
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Despite turmoil from Sen. Duncan Fletcher aimed at keeping the FTC as the 
regulatory agency, the Glass amendment took hold during the conference committee, and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission was created43 as part of the final version of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”).44  The SEC was given jurisdiction 
over both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act yet was provided with no clear mandate.   
The SEC, which was comprised of five commissioners as equally divided between the 
two parties as possible appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, was largely the 
institution as it exists today.  The chairman was to be selected from among the commissioners by 
the President.  President Roosevelt’s initial appointees to the SEC were the controversial Wall 
Streeter Joseph P. Kennedy, FTC Commissioners James Landis and George Matthews, FTC 
Chief Counsel Robert Healy, and Pecora.  Though many had heralded Landis for the post,45 
Kennedy was chosen as the SEC’s first chairman.46  (See Appendix A for timeline of SEC 
chairmen.)  The inaugural commissioners established organizational divisions, began 
promulgating opinions, and, perhaps most importantly, began registering and inspecting 
exchanges.  In its first year, twenty-three hundred cases of potential securities fraud were 
investigated.47  Efforts to “reassure capital” and restore the market were part of the “cooperative” 
policy that Chairman Kennedy established.48 
Chairman Kennedy, realizing the detail-oriented tasks that lay ahead were better suited 
for lawyers, was ready to resign as of May 1935.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                
43 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 99. 
44 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934). 
45 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 101-106. 
46 Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010). For the controversy surrounding 
Kennedy’s appointment, see SCHLESINGER, supra note 18, at 467-469. 
47 Securities and Exchange Commission, First Annual Report, at 31 (June 30, 1935). 
48 Joseph Kennedy, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Address at National Press Club (July 25, 
1934). 
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Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States (1935)49 convinced Kennedy otherwise.50  The Court 
struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act,51 holding that it had effected an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.   Since the Act had been part of the New 
Deal reform measures, other statutes were potentially at risk, including the securities acts.  This 
fear was soon realized.  After Schechter, J. Edward Jones, an oil securities dealer challenged the 
constitutionality of the 1933 Act. In 1936, a federal appeals court upheld the 1933 Act.52  
Kennedy was re-elected chairman of the SEC in July 1935 but resigned in September of 
that year in part due to his opposition to the Roosevelt-sponsored Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 (the “Holding Company Act”).  Commissioner James Landis took over as 
SEC chairman and spent the majority of his term involved in litigation regarding the Holding 
Company Act.53 
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission Moving Forward 
 Landis left the SEC in 1937 to become Dean of Harvard Law School, and President 
Roosevelt appointed William O. Douglas54 to become the third SEC chairman.55  Douglas’s 
tenure was an active one, and he simultaneously pursued numerous initiatives such as continuing 
efforts to reform over-the-counter markets and to establish SEC control under the provisions of 
the Holding Company Act.  Douglas accentuated the SEC’s position as the investor’s advocate 
                                                
49 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
50 Seligman, supra, note 4, at 121-122.   
51 The National Industrial Recovery Act was a piece of New Deal legislation enacted during President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s first term.  At issue in the Schechter case, supra, was the Live Poultry Code promulgated by the NIRA.  
52 SEC v. Jones, — F. 2d — (D.C. Cir. 1935), reversed on other grounds, Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); 
SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 150-151.  For a discussion of the Jones litigation see, note 367, infra. 
53 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 122-138. 
54 For Douglas’s tenure at the SEC, see WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN. THE EARLY YEARS:  THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 257-293, 297-308 (1974); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL:  THE 
LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 106-172 (2003).  President Roosevelt appointed Douglas to the United 
States Supreme Court in 1939.  MURPHY, supra, at 172-175. 
55 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 154. 
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and was quite adversarial in his actions.56  For instance, a battle between Douglas and the New 
York Stock Exchange ensued during the crash of the late 1930s over Douglas’s demands for 
reorganization of the Exchange, especially of the Exchange’s Board of Governors, and for 
passage of trading rules.  Douglas prevailed.  Then in 1938, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) was approved by the SEC as the over-the-counter market regulatory 
organization.57 
 After these accomplishments and continued frustration and work with the Holding 
Company Act, the SEC was then largely ignored by President Harry S. Truman and began a 
decline in the late 1940s.58  President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s strict fiscal policy was the next 
hurdle for the enforcement division of the SEC.  Indeed, Joel Seligman writes that during the 
Eisenhower Administration, the SEC “reached its nadir” and that the SEC’s “enforcement and 
policy-making capabilities were less effective than at any other period in its history.”59  Though 
the Hoover Commission an Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government identified a 
backlog of examinations and the SEC acknowledged the need for strengthening its enforcement 
activities, Eisenhower’s efforts and the Korean War necessitated staffing cuts and contributed to 
a growing backlog of examinations.60  The SEC did not even have a permanent home; its office 
                                                
56 Id. at 157. 
57 Id. at 188. 
58 See id. at 241. 
59 Id. at 265.  
60 Id. at 267. There actually were two Hoover Commissions, one created in 1947 and a second established in 1953, 
both by acts of Congress.  President Truman asked former President Herbert Hoover to chair the first (1947–1949), 
whose aim was to recommend ways for limiting expenditures within the Executive Department “to the lowest 
amount consistent with . . . efficient performance . . . eliminating duplication . . . consolidating services . . . 
abolishing services . . . not necessary; and defining and limiting executive functions.”  The second (1953–1955), 
also chaired by Hoover upon appointment by President Eisenhower, was supposed to recommend changes in social 
and economic policies.  RONALD C. MOE, THE HOOVER COMMISSIONS REVISITED 1-4, 23-33, 81-90 (1982); DAVID 
BURNER, HERBERT HOOVER:  A PUBLIC LIFE 336-337 (1979). 
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was moved to Philadelphia during World War II and then back to Washington, where it was 
stuck in a temporary building.61 
 It was not until the 1960s that the SEC was reinvigorated.  President John F. Kennedy, 
the son of the first SEC head, even brought in former Chairman Landis to make a report on 
regulatory agencies, though no additional White House support was obtained.62  William Cary 
was the SEC chairman during the initial years of this period.  Interestingly, Cary had been both a 
student at Yale Law School and an SEC staff assistant to former Chairman Douglas.  While 
similar in many respects, Cary’s philosophy was different than that of the New Dealers, and 
Cary’s leadership during the early 1960s was an integral part of the reinvigoration of the 
agency.63  The Commission’s Special Study of the Securities Markets, completed in 1963, was 
one of its most important and led to the 1964 Securities Act Amendments, among other 
changes.64  These amendments were disclosure-oriented.65  Upon securing the passage of these 
amendments, Cary resigned, and President Lyndon Johnson appointed Manuel Cohen as SEC 
chairman.66   
Much of the SEC’s next decade of work revolved around focusing increased attention on 
regulating stock exchanges and mutual funds.  During the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, the 
securities industry experienced skyrocketing trading volumes and started to look at automating 
                                                
61 JOHN C. GRAHAM, THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: A RESEARCH AND INFORMATION GUIDE 7-
8 (1993) 
62 See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 290-292.  The Kennedy administration largely practiced “noninterference” with 
regard to the SEC.  See id. at 293. 
63 Id. at 293-294. 
64 GRAHAM, supra note 61, at 8.  See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 304-319 for a discussion of other changes.  Many 
actions resulting from the Special Study, led by Milton Cohen, involved stock exchange reform, which is a topic 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
65 Hugh F. Owens, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Securities Act Amendments of 1964 
Address at the Practising Law Institute (Oct. 16, 1964), available at SEC archives, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1964speech.shtml. 
66 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 348.  Cohen had been at the Commission since 1942 and was highly regarded as an 
SEC attorney and commissioner. See id. at 356. 
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their systems.67  However, under Cohen, the enforcement division of the Commission improved 
and reversed the dismal activity of the division during the 1950s.68  Another issue that came 
toward the end of Cohen’s tenure was the swell of conglomerate-mergers, which ultimately 
involved the SEC, Congress, the accounting profession, and even other federal agencies, all of 
which debated what standards and policies were best to discourage fraud but still promote 
business-friendly guidelines.  This debate revealed the deficiencies of the SEC’s regulation of 
accounting principles and emphasized the agency’s primary focus on the overall securities 
industry.69   
 Exploring the balance of regulatory activism by the SEC continued into the Nixon 
presidency, especially since the first three chairmen selected by President Nixon were largely 
political appointees.  Seligman has observed, “[a]s chairman, [Hamer] Budge attempted to 
reverse the activism of the later Cohen years.”70  Nixon’s second chairman, William Casey, 
managed to land SEC budget and staffing increases but was still controversial and resigned early, 
as did his successor, G. Bradford Cook.  Ultimately, Nixon improved his SEC appointment 
record by nominating Ray Garrett as chairman.  Garrett and his colleagues made the SEC a 
vibrant agency again.71  In 1975, for instance, the Garrett-led Commission even ended the 
decades-long deregulation debate regarding fixed commission rates with Rule 19b-3, which 
ended the use of fixed rates.72   
                                                
67 Id. at 352-354. 
68 Id. at 360-363. 
69 Id. at 416-438. 
70 Id. at 441. 
71 Id. at 450. 
72 Id. at 483; see PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 4, at 53-54.  The NYSE, since its founding in 1792, had employed 
the use of fixed commission rates.  See 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 
FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 29 (2002). 
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Major issues for the SEC between 1975 and 1981 included implementing technology into 
the securities industry and facilitating the development of a national market system.73  
Interestingly, corporate governance was not given much attention during this time period, and 
the Commission completed no special studies like those published earlier on other securities and 
corporate issues facing the SEC.  However, progress on this front was made outside the SEC 
through a Harvard Business School study by Myles Mace, which was perhaps “the most 
influential academic work” regarding corporate boards and directors.74  Furthermore, the 
Watergate Special Prosecution Force and SEC’s Enforcement Division vigorously investigated 
corporate bribery cases and other improprieties.  The Commission did not support new federal 
corporate governance legislation but did push additional voluntary disclosure and director 
independence measures up through the 1980s.75  The SEC and its mandate have continued to 
evolve with the sustained growth of the market, the development of new financial instruments 
and risk management techniques, globalization, and the changing investor environment (e.g., 
increasing number of institutional investors like public pension funds).  Furthermore, the 
Commission has had to work alongside the exchanges (e.g., NYSE) and other agencies (e.g., 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission) as part of the exchange-side of the SEC mandate.76   
 Though the SEC generally has maintained what one commentator has deemed a 
reputation as “an outstanding example of the independent commission at its best,”77 the 
sufficiency of the SEC’s mandatory disclosure system has been questioned at times throughout 
the Commission’s history.  University of Rochester Professor George Benston hypothesized that 
“there was no value whatsoever to the mandatory disclosures required by the 1933 and 1934 
                                                
73 See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 486-534. 
74 Id. at 537. 
75 Id. at 549-550. 
76 See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, 569-622. 
77 Id. at 568; see PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 4, at 5. 
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Securities Acts.”78  Failures by the SEC during the financial crisis of 2008 have led to further 
questioning and criticisms of the SEC.79  However, the ability of the SEC to maintain a strong 
disclosure environment lies within its enforcement authority.  Legislation has expanded the 
remedial functions, administrative agency process, and legal action tools of the SEC.80  
Today, the SEC exists largely as it did at its inception.  The SEC has five commissioners 
and is a bipartisan independent agency.  The Commission is charged with enforcing the federal 
securities laws and has significant rule-making authority.  In summary, the SEC has been 
influenced by the political process, and the effects are evident in the cyclical nature of 
Commission activism.  Though the SEC is an independent agency, the reality is that its 
commissioners are political appointees.  The Commission’s broad jurisdiction, however, has not 
always coincided with sufficient resources to adequately address every issue subject to the SEC’s 
oversight.  Therefore, the SEC largely became an overseer of industry self-regulation.  Again, the 
SEC is a disclosure-enforcement agency, and the SEC is at the center of the federal securities 
laws’ mission to effect “the remediation of information asymmetries.”81  The Commission is not 
in the business of judging or recommending securities offered to investors; rather, the SEC is 
responsible for protecting investors through requiring and monitoring disclosure from entities 
involved in the securities market.82 
B. The Promulgation of Auditing Standards 
                                                
78 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 563; see George Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973). 
79 See, e.g., Michael R. Crittenden & Kara Scannell, Report Says SEC Missed Many Shots at Stanford, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 17, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303491304575188220570802084. 
html?KEYWORDS=SEC+Missed+Shots; Ianthe J. Dugan & David Crawford, Accounting Firms That Missed 
Fraud at Madoff May be Liable, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, at C1; Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Faces Setbacks, 
Skepticism in Trying to Reform Its Enforcement Image, WASH. POST., Apr. 6, 2010; Tom McGinty, Staffer One Day, 
Opponent the Next, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2010, at C1; Kara Scannell, SEC Moves to Fix Its Blind Spots, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 12, 2009, at C3. 
80 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 617-618, 621. 
81 Id. at 604. 
82 GRAHAM, supra note 61, at 6. 
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By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial 
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any 
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant 
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's 
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public 
watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence 
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To 
insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the 
client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of the 
accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations. 
 
— U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-818 (1984) (Burger, C.J.) 
* * * 
This section will discuss the background of auditing standards for public companies in 
the United States and will reveal the government’s neglect for accounting standards.  The 
promulgation of accounting principles and the SEC have interwoven histories.  As Seligman has 
noted, “Kennedy and Landis had viewed accounting reform as subordinate in importance to 
capital flotation.”83  Moreover, Landis instructed the Commission’s Chief Accountant, Carman 
Blough, not to develop “uniform or industry-wide accounting principles” but to, according to 
Seligman, merely “pur[sue] a policy of cooperation with the accounting profession.”84  SEC 
Chairman Douglas (1937-1939) also was unsuccessful in his efforts to change accounting 
policies during his tenure.  During this same time, SEC studies on the topic proved to be 
ineffective, and the SEC’s chief accountant claimed to not have the resources to develop a 
comprehensive accounting framework.85 Moreover, even decades later, SEC Chief Accountant 
Andrew Barr was reluctant to engage the SEC’s authority in the accounting standard-setting role 
except in limited cases.86   
                                                
83 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 198. 
84 SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 198-199. 
85 Id. 
86 See SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 424-426 (e.g., the “pooling versus purchase” method of accounting controversy in 
the 1960s-1970s). 
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Congress exhibited a similar sentiment.  For instance, during 1933 hearings of the Senate 
Banking and Currency Committee, the testimony of Colonel Arthur H. Carter, President of the 
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, helped convince the legislators to rely 
on the industry’s public auditors rather than on government auditors.  Carter emphasized the 
importance of independent auditors.  Unfamiliarity with auditing and a lack of interest in the 
topic on the part of senators is apparent from the hearing transcripts.87  Not surprisingly, the 
accounting profession was self-regulated and promulgated accounting standards under the 
supervision of the SEC.  The securities acts did little to define auditing standards but did put the 
topic on the table.  Before Congress created the PCAOB, the SEC had relied upon private 
organizations affiliated with the accounting profession to set and enforce auditing standards: 
Accounting firms or their representatives controlled or funded those 
organizations.  As a result, “standards tend[ed] to be written to protect the 
accounting firms.”  Enforcement was similarly ineffective.  While the profession 
created a Public Oversight Board (“POB”) in the 1970s to conduct “peer 
reviews,” for more than 20 years “there ha[d] never been a negative review of a 
major firm.”  And when the POB sought to investigate several firms in 2000, the 
profession cut off its funding.88 
 
For decades, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) was the 
issuer of auditing standards, from which it is important to distinguish accounting standards (i.e., 
financial reporting standards) which the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issues.89  
Both the SEC and AICPA recognize as authoritative the financial accounting standards 
                                                
87 JEREMY WIESEN, THE SECURITIES ACTS AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS: WHAT DID CONGRESS INTEND?: A 
RESEARCH STUDY 8, 28-29 (1978) 
88 Brief for PCAOB et al. at 2 (citations omitted).  The profession was controlled at the time by the AICPA, which 
was the entity that actually created the POB. 
89 Financial Accounting Standards Board, http://www.fasb.org/home.  The ACIPA was initially the American 
Association for Public Accountants, created in 1887.  This organization became the American Institute of 
Accountants, which became the AICPA in 1957.  The AICPA used its Committee on Accounting Procedure to 
formulate standards, but years of inactivity by that group followed by Accounting Research Bulletins that permitted 
deviation from the standards led the AICPA to create the Accounting Principles Board (APB) to promulgate 
accounting standards, which was later replaced with FASB in 1973 after controversy within the profession; See 
JOHN COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 130-133 (2006); SELIGMAN, 
supra note 4, at 420, 554. 
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promulgated by FASB.  The AICPA Board of Directors is comprised of individuals from within 
the industry and the accounting profession.   
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the framework for developing and enforcing 
auditing standards for public companies changed.  Self-regulation of the profession was to be no 
more.  SOX created the PCAOB to oversee the auditors of public companies.90  The PCAOB is 
charged with promulgating auditing and independence and ethics standards, which are subject to 
approval by the SEC.91  Additionally, the PCAOB has inspection and enforcement authority over 
auditors of public companies.  In April 2003, the PCAOB adopted auditing standards issued by 
the AICPA, effective as of April 16, 2003, as Interim Auditing Standards.92  Note that the 
PCAOB does not oversee auditors of private entities, and the AICPA still promulgates standards 
for these audits.93 
C.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The dot-com bust in the late 1990s and highly publicized scandals in the early 2000s led 
both the public and Congress to call for federal reform.94  Most argued that legislation to restore 
investor confidence was needed.  Growing skepticism of the thoroughness of accounting firm 
peer reviews and the self-regulated profession only exacerbated this desire for intervention.95  
                                                
90 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a). 
91 Id. at § 101(c)-101(d). 
92 PCAOB History, http://pcaobus.org/About/History/Pages/History.aspx (last accessed March 15, 2010). 
93 Timothy J. Louwers, et al., Auditing & Assurance Services 36 (McGraw-Hill Irwin 2008) (2005).  Despite the 
PCAOB only having authority over public companies, its professional standards have prompted states such as 
California to incorporate PCAOB rules in the state law applicable to all companies. Id. at 546. 
94 For more about Enron and other corporate scandals, see ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE 
CORPORATE SCANDAL READER (Nancy Rapoport, Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2 ed. 2009); 
GOVERNANCE, RISK, AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK:  TECHNOLOGY, FINANCE, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE AND BEST PRACTICES (Anthony Tarantino, ed., 2008); JERRY M. MARKHAM, A 
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS:  FROM ENRON TO REFORM (2006); BETHANY 
MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF 
ENRON (2003); MALCOLM S. SALTER, INNOVATION CORRUPTED: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF ENRON’S COLLAPSE 
(2008). 
95 As part of self-regulation, accounting firms used to engage in peer reviews.  Generally, favorable reviews were 
issued.  Concern grew over the thoroughness of this practice.  See Brief for PCAOB, supra note 88. 
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The scandal and failures at Enron, in particular, motivated Congress to respond to these calls for 
reform, but it took the events at WorldCom to push SOX through quickly.96   
Named after its sponsors, Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and Representative Michael 
Oxley (R-OH), SOX mandated significant financial reporting and corporate governance reform 
for public companies. Non-compliance with SOX can result in civil lawsuits against offending 
companies and in criminal punishment in the form of fines and incarceration for officers of those 
companies.97 
1.  Sarbanes-Oxley Titles with Short Description 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is organized into eleven, discrete titles, as follows: 
Title I – Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 
Title I establishes the PCAOB, which is charged with registering accounting firms that 
audit public companies.  SOX vests in the PCAOB the authority to promulgate auditing 
standards and also provides inspection and enforcement authority over registered firms.  
Title II – Auditor Independence  
Sections in this Title mandate audit firm independence standards, such as partner rotation 
and reduction in conflicts of interest. 
Title III – Corporate Responsibility 
Title III requires that principal executive and financial officers (e.g., CEOs, CFOs) of a 
company sign financial statements certifying that, to their knowledge, the statements contain no 
material omissions or misstatements.  Claw-backs of certain bonuses and payments and insider 
trading prohibitions are also provided for in Title III. 
Title IV – Enhanced Financial Disclosures 
                                                
96 Mary-Jo Kranacher, The Future of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Exclusive Interview with Former U.S. Senator Paul S. 
Sarbanes, 78 THE CPA J. 16, 21(Oct. 2008); SALTER, supra note 94, at 247. Indeed, SOX passed in the Senate 99-0. 
97 GOVERNANCE, supra note 94, at 952. 
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Title IV establishes additional disclosures regarding management and material changes 
(real-time disclosure through use of the 8-K Form) and prohibits personal loans to executives 
from companies.  Section 404 of SOX, in particular, requires assessment of internal controls both 
by management and auditors. 
Title V – Analyst Conflicts of Interest 
This short Title addresses conflicts of interest regarding analysts recommending 
securities in the exchanges. 
 Title VI – Commission Resources and Authority 
Title VI’s provisions deal with appropriations, appearance requirements before the 
Commission, and broker-dealer qualifications. 
Title VII – Studies and Reports 
Title VII mandates separate studies by the Comptroller General on the (1) consolidation 
of public accounting firms, and (2) earnings manipulation by investment banks; and by the 
Commission on (1) credit rating agencies, (2) violations by professionals, and (3) enforcement 
actions. 
Title VIII – Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability 
Title VIII reviews federal penalties and sentencing guidelines and provides whistleblower 
protection for employees of publicly traded companies.  It also mandates the length of time audit 
firms have to retain workpapers. 
Title IX – White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements 
Title IX provides for the continued revision of federal penalties for corporate fraud. 
 
 
 22 
 
Title X – Corporate Tax Returns 
Title X provides that it is the “sense of the Senate that the Federal income tax return of a 
corporation should be signed by the chief executive officer.”  
Title XI – Corporate Fraud and Accountability 
Title XI also addresses federal penalties for fraud and gives the Commission authority to 
bar persons from serving as directors or officers of publicly traded companies. 
2. On-Going Issues with Sarbanes-Oxley 
Most of the issues that have arisen from SOX are beyond the scope of this paper, except 
for any provisions relating to the constitutionality of the PCAOB.  For instance, Section 404, 
which requires an evaluation of internal controls, has generated significant backlash from the 
business community.98 
3. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
The PCAOB website states that: 
the PCAOB is a private-sector, nonprofit corporation created by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee the auditors of public companies in order to protect 
investors and the public interest by promoting informative, fair, and independent 
audit reports.99   
 
SOX charges the PCAOB with setting standards and rules for auditing, quality control, ethics, 
attestation, and independence.  The PCAOB compels the registration of accounting firms that 
                                                
98 Outside the PCAOB constitutionality issues, Section 404 has likely been the most controversial piece of SOX, as 
public companies have objected to the costs of compliance.  See GOVERNANCE, supra note 94, at 911.  The 
PCAOB’s Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) was issued to cover Section 404 but was later superseded by AS5.  Id. at 
915; see PCAOB Standards, http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/default.aspx.  See Letter from Big 4 Firms 
to Jonathan Katz, SEC Secretary (Apr. 11, 2005) (available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/soxcomp/soxcomp-
all.pdf) (describing compliance costs and remediation of internal control deficiencies).  Small public companies 
(under $75 million in market capitalization) are not yet subject to Section 404 but are thought to likely be subject to 
this requirement soon.  Kranacher, supra note 96, at 18. 
99 About the PCAOB, see PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx 
 23 
 
audit public companies and also has the authority to inspect these firms.   Finally, the PCAOB is 
vested with investigatory and enforcement authority.100 
The revenue-raising function of the PCAOB is unusual but not unprecedented.  SOX 
requires that accounting firms pay registration fees, but the bulk of the PCAOB’s revenue comes 
from SOX-mandated support fees paid by public companies.101  There is a nearly one-hundred 
percent success rate in the collection of this support fee because, per PCAOB Rule 7103 (b), 
PCAOB-registered auditors are, absent a waiver, prohibited from signing a report unless their 
client has paid the fee.102  Without a report, the company falls out of SEC compliance.103  The 
PCAOB was so created to avoid the turnover problems characteristic of the SEC and other 
governmental agencies, as well as to be able to attract top staff, since the Board can pay higher 
salaries than the government. 
Since adopting the Interim Auditing Standards in April 2003, the PCAOB has issued 
seven auditing standards: 
AS No. 1:  References in Auditors’ Reports to the Standards of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board 
AS1 describes the adoption of the Interim Auditing Standards and provides that 
“reference to generally accepted auditing standards in auditor’s reports was not 
longer appropriate or necessary.”104 
 
 
                                                
100 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §101. 
101 Accounting Support Fee, PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/About/Ops/Pages/SupportFee.aspx. 
102 Available at http://pcaobus.org/Rules/PCAOBRules/Pages/Section_7.aspx. 
103 Joseph V. Carcello, Professor, University of Tennessee, Accounting 519 Class Lecture (Feb. 17, 2010). 
104 PCAOB Standard AS No. 1 § 5. 
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AS No. 2:  An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in 
Conjunction With an Audit of Financial Statements 
AS2 superseded by AS5, effective May 2007.  AS2 was the standard for audits 
over internal control, as required by SOX Section 404.  “AS2 was far more 
expensive and far more intrusive than expected.  It came out of a natural 
conservatism, post-Enron, and the manner in which it was implemented was far to 
intrusive,”105 said Mark W. Olson, former PCAOB chairman. 
 AS No. 3:  Audit Documentation 
AS3 describes what documentation is required for audit procedures (e.g., 
memoranda, confirmations, correspondence, schedules, audit programs, and 
letters of representation).  This documentation must be accurate and conform to 
certain procedures provided by AS3.  Audit workpapers must be kept for seven 
years, as provided by SOX. 
AS No. 4:  Reporting on Whether a Previously Reported Material Weakness Continues 
to Exist 
AS4 applies during an engagement to report on whether a previously reported 
material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting still exists.  The 
standard gives guidance for performing this engagement. 
 
 
 
                                                
105 Deborah J. Davidson, Five Years of the PCAOB: Reflections on the Board, 32 DIRECTORS MONTHLY 5, National 
Association of Corporate Directors (May 2008). 
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 AS No. 5:  An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated
 with An Audit of Financial Statements 
AS5 supersedes AS2 and directs the auditor’s assessment of management’s report 
over internal controls (as required by SOX Section 404).  This standard is less 
controversial than its predecessor. 
 AS No. 6:  Evaluating Consistency of Financial Statements 
AS6 pertains to consistency in financial statements and provides guidance on 
comparability, changes in accounting principle, correction of material 
misstatement, and changes in classification in financial statements. 
 AS No. 7:  Engagement Quality Review 
Each audit engagement is required to have a quality review.  AS7 provides 
guidance for these reviews as well as the qualifications of the reviewers. 
The PCAOB also promulgates rules on ethics and independence, has interim standards for other 
aspects of the audit, and provides guidance on compliance with the auditing standards.106 
4. SEC Control over the PCAOB 
 
During the legislative process that resulted in the enactment of SOX, Congress appears to 
have initially considered vesting the new regulatory responsibilities in the SEC itself but rejected 
that approach because the SEC was “‘already overtaxed’” and thus could not “‘effectively 
discharge these additional requirements.’”107  Once it was decided to vest these duties in the 
PCAOB, Congress nonetheless recognized the need for extensive, comprehensive SEC 
supervisory control over the PCAOB both for constitutional reasons and to prevent duplication 
                                                
106  PCAOB Standards available at http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/default.aspx. 
107 See Brief for PCAOB at 3. 
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of efforts.  SOX imposes certain controls over the PCAOB by the SEC by providing that the SEC 
“shall have oversight and enforcement authority over the Board”108 as follows: 
 (1) the SEC is empowered to set Board rules and procedures;109 
 
 (2) the SEC is empowered to approve the budget of the Board;110 
 
 (3) the SEC is empowered to approve the “reasonable annual accounting support fee 
(or a formula for the computation thereof)” established by the Board “as may be 
necessary or appropriate to establish and maintain the Board;”111 
 
 (4) the SEC is empowered to “enhance, modify, cancel, reduce, or require the 
remission of” any sanction imposed by the Board upon a registered public 
accounting firm or associated person thereof, if the Commission, “having due 
regard for the public interest and the protection of investors,” finds that the 
sanction either is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of this Act or the 
securities laws or is excessive, oppressive, inadequate, or otherwise not 
appropriate to the finding or the basis on which the sanction was imposed;112 
 
 (5) the SEC is empowered to review any action taken by the Board when a registered 
public accounting firm or any associated person thereof refuses to testify, produce 
documents, or otherwise cooperate with the Board in connection with an 
investigation and when such action consists of (i) a suspension or bar of such 
person from being associated with a registered public accounting firm or a 
requirement that the registered public accounting firm end such association, (ii) a 
suspension or revocation of the registration of the public accounting firm; and (iii) 
such other lesser sanctions as the Board considers appropriate;113 
 
 (6) the SEC is empowered to conduct an interim review, at the request of a registered 
public accounting firm, of certain Board inspection determinations if such firm (i) 
has provided the Board with a response to the substance of particular items in a 
draft inspection report and disagrees with the assessments contained in any final 
report prepared by the Board following such response or (ii) disagrees with the 
determination of the Board that criticisms or defects identified in an inspection 
report have not been addressed to the satisfaction of the Board;114 
 
 (7) the SEC is empowered to limit or relieve the Board of its powers and to censure 
or impose limitations upon the activities, functions, and operations of the Board if 
the SEC finds that has violated or is unable to comply with any provision of SOX, 
                                                
108 15 U.S.C. § 7217(a). 
109 Id. at § 7217(b)(2) (“[n]o rule of the Board shall become effective without prior approval of the Commission”). 
110 Id. at § 7219(b). 
111 Id. at § 7219(d)(1). 
112 Id. at § 7217(c)(3). 
113 Id. at § 7215(b)(3). 
114 Id. at § 7214(h)(1). 
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the rules of the Board, or the securities laws or, without reasonable justification or 
excuse, has failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule or any 
professional standard by a registered public accounting firm or an associated 
person thereof;115 
 
 (8) the SEC is empowered to remove or censure any member of the Board 
who has willfully violated any provision of SOX, the rules of the Board, or the 
securities laws; has willfully abused the member’s authority; or, without 
reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance with any such 
provision or rule or any professional standard by any registered public accounting 
firm or any associated person thereof;116 
 
 (9) the SEC is empowered to amend and to “abrogate, add to, and delete from” the 
Board’s rules “to assure the fair administration of the [Board], conform the rules 
promulgated by the Board to the requirements of Title I of SOX, or otherwise 
further the purposes of SOX, the securities laws, and the rules and regulations 
thereunder applicable to that Board;”117 
 
 (10) the SEC is empowered to review de novo all Board adjudications in the form of 
final disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Board upon an immediate stay when 
an application for review is filed or sua sponte by the SEC;118 
 
 (11) the SEC has the sole authority to determine whether the Board may sue and be 
sued in any court;119 and 
 
 (12) the SEC is empowered to exempt any foreign public accounting firm or any class 
of such firms from any provision of SOX or the rules of the Board or the SEC 
issued under SOX.120 
 
D. The PCAOB Challenged 
 
The constitutionality of the PCAOB has been challenged in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“Free Enterprise Fund case”).121  At the center of 
this challenge is the United States Constitution’s Appointments Clause and separation-of-powers 
                                                
115 Id. at § 7217(d)(1)-(2). 
116 Id. at §§  7217(d)(3), 7211(c)(6). 
117 Id. at § 7217(b)(5); see id. at § 78s(c). 
118 Id. at § 7217(c)(2); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB II), 537 F. 3d 667, 670 
(2008). 
119 15 U.S.C. § 7211(f)(1). 
120 15 U.S.C. § 7216(c). 
121 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Com. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F. 3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (hereinafter PCAOB 
II).  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and oral arguments were heard Dec. 7, 2009. See Free 
Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, Docket No. 08-861at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts.aspx. The decision is expected in the spring or summer of 2010. 
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principles.  The petitioners allege that vesting the appointment of the members of the PCAOB in 
the SEC violates the Appointments Clause and separation-of-powers principles and thus is 
unconstitutional.  A federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the PCAOB, and 
a federal appellate court affirmed.  The plaintiffs appealed these adverse rulings to the United 
States Supreme Court, where a decision is pending. 
III. The Legal Issues 
 
A. The Legal Issues—Background and Overview 
 
 The primary legal issues raised by the PCAOB appeal now pending in the Supreme Court 
arise under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the United States Constitution and under the 
separation-of-powers provisions of the Constitution, but the case also poses potentially 
significant collateral legal issues concerning the political accountability of the President for the 
actions taken by independent agencies within the government and the ultimate burden of 
persuasion in a case in which the plaintiffs assert a facial challenge, as opposed to an as-applied 
challenge, to the constitutionality of an act of Congress. 
B. The Appointments Clause Issues 
The Appointments Clause refers to Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, 
which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of 
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.122 
 
As the Supreme Court has long recognized, the Appointments Clause is 
                                                
122 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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more than a matter of “etiquette or protocol”; it is among the significant structural 
safeguards of the constitutional scheme.  By vesting the President with the 
exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, 
the Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the 
Executive and Judicial Branches.123 
 
 The latter provision of the Appointments Clause, which is sometimes referred to as the 
“Excepting Clause,” was “added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand 
Convention, with little discussion. . . . [and] its obvious purpose is administrative 
convenience.”124 
 For purposes of appointment, Supreme Court has declared, the Constitution “very clearly 
divides all its officers into two classes”:  first, principal officers of the United States who are 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and, second, inferior officers whose 
appointment is vested in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of 
departments.125  As the Supreme Court has noted on several occasions, “The line between 
‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little 
guidance into where it should be drawn.”126 
 Several factors are pertinent in determining whether one is a principal or inferior officer:  
(1) whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher official within the Executive Branch, (2) 
whether the officer’s duties are limited, (3) whether the officer’s jurisdiction is narrow, and (4) 
whether the officer’s tenure is limited.127  Although the Supreme Court’s decisions have not 
established exclusive criteria for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for 
purposes of the Appointments Clause, the Court has found that the following governmental 
positions constitute those of inferior officers:  judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal 
                                                
123 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). 
124 Id. at 660. 
125 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-510 (1878); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976). 
126 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988). 
127 Id. at 671-672; see Edmond, 520 U.S. at 661. 
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Appeals,128 a special trial judge appointed to assist the United States Tax Court,129 an 
independent counsel created by provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,130 a United 
States commissioner in federal district court proceedings,131 a federal district court clerk,132 a 
vice consul charged temporarily with duties of the consul,133 and a federal election supervisor.134  
“Generally speaking,” the Court has observed, 
the term “inferior officer” connotes a relationship with some higher ranking 
officer or officers below the President:  Whether one is an “inferior” officer 
depends on whether he has a superior. . . . [I]n the context of a Clause designed to 
preserve political accountability relative to important Government assignments, 
we think it evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential 
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.135 
 
“What is significant,” the Court has concluded, “is that [inferior officers] have no power to 
render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other 
Executive officers.”136 
 In addition, certain governmental appointees are merely employees and not officers of the 
United States at all and thus are not subject to the provisions of the Appointments Clause.  
Among the factors considered in determining whether such an appointee is an officer of the 
federal government are the appointee’s tenure, the duration of that tenure, the appointee’s 
compensation, and the nature and duration of his or her duties.137  When the appointee’s duties 
are occasional or temporary as opposed to continuing and permanent and when no regular 
                                                
128 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 666. 
129 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, --- (1991). 
130 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671. 
131 Go Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-354 (1931). 
132 Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839). 
133 United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898). 
134 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-398 (1880). 
135 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662, 663. 
136 Id. at 665.  Accord Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
137 See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509-512. 
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appropriation is made for the appointee’s compensation, the appointee might be determined to be 
a governmental employee rather than an officer of the government.138 
 Other than in Article II, Section 4, which provides for the removal of the President and 
Vice President and all civil officers of the United States by impeachment for high crimes and 
misdemeanors, the Constitution does not contain any provision for the removal from office of 
officers of the United States.  “The subject,” the Supreme Court has noted, “was not discussed in 
the Constitutional Convention,”139 and there has since remained an extended controversy about 
whether administrative officers—i.e., officers of administrative agencies within the Executive 
Branch and those of administrative agencies whose functions and powers are intended to be 
independent of the Executive Branch—may be removed in the President’s sole discretion or 
whether Congress may play a role in such removals or limit the President’s power to remove 
such officers.  The positions of the respective sides to the controversy have been described as 
follows: 
 The argument supporting presidential discretion holds that the chief 
executive must be free to remove those subordinates who fail to meet the 
president’s expectations or who are not loyal to the administration’s policy 
objectives.  It would be unreasonable to require the approval of Congress before 
such officials could be dismissed.  Such a requirement might well paralyze the 
executive branch, particularly when the legislature and the presidency are under 
the control of different political parties. 
 
 The argument for legislative participation in the [removal] process holds 
that the Constitution anticipates Senate action.  If the president can appoint major 
executive department officials only with senatorial approval, it is reasonable to 
infer that the chief executive can remove administrators only by going through the 
same process and obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate.140 
 
 
 
                                                
138 See id. 
139 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 109-110 (1926). 
140 LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA:  INSTITUTIONAL 
POWERS AND CONTRAINTS 228-229 (6th ed. 2007). 
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1. Myers v. United States 
Myers v. United States141 involved the removal of a postmaster on order by the President 
of the United States.  An 1876 act of Congress gave the President the authority to appointment 
postmasters by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.  Pursuant to the statute, President 
Woodrow Wilson appointed Frank Myers as a first-class postmaster of Portland, Oregon, in 
1917.  The term of his appointment was for four years.  In 1920, Wilson asked Myers to resign.  
Myers refused, and, acting under Wilson’s orders, the Postmaster General fired Myers.  Myers 
filed suit in the U.S. Court of Claims for his salary from the date of his removal.  The Court of 
Claims ruled against Myers,142 who appealed his case to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft143 delivered the opinion of the Court.  Providing a 
tedious account of the legislative deliberations of the First Congress regarding the debate over 
the President’s appointment power,144 the Chief Justice wrote: 
The history of the clause by which the Senate was given a check upon the 
President’s power of appointment makes it clear that it was not prompted by any 
desire to limit removals…[Rather, it] was to lodge in the Senate…power to 
prevent the President from making too many appointments from the larger 
States.145   
 
It is important to point out that Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution vests the executive power 
of the government in the President (the “Vesting Clause”) and that Section 3 of Article II 
provides that “he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed” (the “Take Care 
                                                
141 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) 
142 Id. at 106-107. 
143 William Howard Taft served as President of the United States from 1909-1913.  He was later appointed by 
President Warren G. Harding as Chief Justice of the United States.  He served on the Supreme Court from 1921 to 
just before his death in 1930.  See White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ about/presidents/williamhowardtaft. 
144 Myers, 272 U.S. at 106-133 (1926).  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis filed dissenting 
opinions.  Justice James McReynolds filed a separate opinion.  The Myers opinions took up 243 pages of the volume 
of United States Reports in which they were printed. 
145 Id. at 119-120 . 
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Clause”),146 both of which suggest that the president should of necessity be able to select and 
remove officers acting under his direction.  Such was the conclusion that had been reached by 
the Court in Shurtleff v. United States,147 a case involving President William McKinley’s 
removal from office of a general appraiser of merchandise who had been appointed by 
McKinley’s predecessor.  In Shurtleff, the Court held that the President has the constitutional 
authority to remove officers even if they were appointed by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.  Furthermore, the consent (or rejection) of an appointment by the Senate is different 
than the ability to prevent the removal of an officer.  As Chief Justice Taft wrote: 
The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment, not to the power of 
advising and consenting to appointment, and when the grant of the executive 
power is enforced by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, it emphasizes the necessity of including within the executive power as 
conferred the exclusive power of removal.148 
 
“The power to remove officers, we have recognized, is a powerful tool for control.”  Thus 
wrote Justice Antonin Scalia in his opinion in 1997 for the Court in Edmond v. United States.149  
More than seven decades earlier, the Court in Myers concluded that the Appointments Clause 
“give[s] to Congress the power to limit and regulate removal of such inferior officers by heads of 
departments when it exercises its constitutional power to lodge the power of appointment with 
them”:150 
Congress, in committing the appointment of such inferior officers to the heads of 
departments, may prescribe incidental regulations controlling and restricting the 
latter in the exercise of the power of removal.151 
                                                
146 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. 
147 Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903). 
148 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926). 
149 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. at 664 (Scalia, J.) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), and 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. at 727). 
150 Myers, 272 U.S. at 127.  Accord, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 
F.3d 667, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
151 Myers,  272 U.S. at 161.  “ But the Court has never held,” Chief Justice Taft continued, “nor reasonably could 
hold, . . . that the excepting clause enables Congress to draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove 
or the right to participate in the exercise of that power.”  Id. at 164. 
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The authority for the Myers Court’s conclusion came from the Court’s earlier decision in United 
States v. Perkins,152 which recited with approval the following passage from the opinion of the 
Court of Claims that was then under review: 
We have no doubt that when congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior 
officers in the heads of departments, it may limit and restrict the power of 
removal as it deems best for the public interest.  The constitutional authority in 
congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and 
regulate the removal by such laws as congress may enact in relation to the officers 
so appointed.153 
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court thus affirmed the Court of Claims’ judgment against 
Myers.  The Chief Justice wrote, “[the Court] must therefore hold that the provision of the law of 
1876, by which the unrestricted power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to the 
President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid.”154  In effect, the Court held that 
Congress cannot limit the President’s removal power. 
2. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States 
Less than a decade later, in 1935, the Court decided Humphrey’s Executor v. United 
States,155 which characterized much of Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Myers as dicta (and thus 
not binding) and confined Myers to presidential removal of officers within the Executive Branch.  
President Herbert Hoover had appointed William Humphrey to the Federal Trade Commission in 
1931.  Humphrey’s appointment was for a seven-year term, which was scheduled to expire in 
1938.  Under the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, FTC commissioners could be 
removed from office by the President “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in 
                                                
152 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).   
153 Id. at 485. 
154 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176. 
155 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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office.”156  However, in 1933, President Roosevelt asked for Humphrey’s resignation due to their 
differences regarding policy and the FTC.  Humphrey declined, and Roosevelt sent 
correspondence effectively removing him from the FTC.  Humphrey filed suit in the U.S. Court 
of Claims, seeking an award of compensation for the period of service from the date of his 
discharge through the end of his statutory term.  The Court of Claims certified two questions to 
the Supreme Court:157  (1) Does the FTC Act’s provision that “any commissioner may be 
removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” limit the 
President’s removal authority to these causes only and (2) if so, is such a restriction 
constitutional?158  The government drew on Shurtleff, but the Court distinguished the 
appointment of an FTC Commissioner as involving a fixed term whereas the potentially 
unlimited appointment in Shurtleff had not.159  This creative interpretation allowed the Court to 
ignore the precedent established by Shurtleff.  Removal power thus was limited by the Court in 
Humphrey’s Executor to facilitate the independence of the FTC, and, hence, the first question 
was answered in the affirmative.160  Faced with the second question, the Court yet again 
distinguished precedent and limited Myers to having only “decided…that the President has 
power to remove a postmaster of the first class without the advice and consent of the Senate.”161  
This narrow reading plus “putting aside [the] dicta”162 of Myers meant to the Court that its earlier 
decision had pertained only to “purely executive officers.”163  The FTC, however, the Court 
                                                
156 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41. 
157 Certification is the procedure used by a federal court of appeals (and, throughout most of the twentieth century, 
the U.S. Court of Claims) to certify to the Supreme Court for binding instructions concerning questions of law that 
are at issue in a case and about which the lower court entertains doubt.  Tinsley Yarbrough, Certification, in THE 
OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 153-154 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
158 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 619. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 621. 
161 Id. at 626. 
162 Id. at 627. 
163 Id. at 628. 
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found, “acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially,”164 and, hence, an 
administrative agency acting in this manner is not solely Executive in nature.  Furthermore, 
ensuring that agencies like the FTC function independently and maintaining fidelity to the 
separation-of-powers principle demand that the President’s removal authority be limited to “for 
cause” pursuant to the statute.  Thus, the second certified question was answered by the Court in 
the affirmative. 
The Court’s unanimous decision in Humphrey’s Executor relied on a functions analysis.  
Was the FTC not, however, carrying out the laws of the United States, thus rendering it an arm 
of the President as it relates to the Take Care Clause?  Regardless, the case effected a change in 
thinking about the Appointments Clause that remains a central feature of the analysis used in 
current Appointments Clause cases.  There was no dissenting opinion in the case. 
3. Wiener v. United States  
 Scarcely more than a quarter of a century later, in 1958, the Court in Wiener v. United 
States165 reaffirmed the principles that had been announced in Humphrey’s Executor.  At issue in 
Weiner was whether the President had the constitutional or statutory power to remove from 
office a member of the War Claims Commission (the “WCC”), a body that had been created by 
Congress in the War Claims Act of 1948 to receive, consider, and adjudicate claims for the 
compensation of individuals who had sustained injuries at the hands of enemies of the United 
States during World War II.  The statute provided that the WCC was to be comprised of three 
members who were to be appointed by the President by and with the consent of the Senate and 
that the decisions of the WCC were to be final and “not subject to review by any other official of 
the United States or by any court.”  Each commission member was to serve a term that ended 
                                                
164 Id. 
165 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
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when the WCC had finalized its responsibilities and gone out of existence.  The War Claims Act 
contained no provisions addressing how and under what circumstances a WCC commissioner 
might be removed from office prior to the completion of the commission’s work. 
 In June of 1950, President Harry S. Truman appointed Myron Wiener to the WCC, and 
shortly thereafter, Wiener’s appointment was confirmed by the Senate.  When President 
Truman’s successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, took office, he wished to replace the WCC’s 
commissioners with members of his own selection.  When President Eisenhower asked for the 
resignations of the incumbent WCC commissioners, however, they refused.  In December of 
1953, the President ordered them dismissed and made recess appointments to the WCC.  When 
Congress assembled in January of 1954, the President sent the names of the new appointees to 
the Senate for confirmation, but the Senate had not confirmed the President’s nominations when 
the WCC was abolished by statute later in 1954.  Wiener thereafter filed a petition with the U.S. 
Court of Claims, seeking payment of his salary as a WCC commissioner from the date of his 
removal from office by the President in late 1953 through the last day of the WCC’s existence in 
1954.  A divided Court of Claims dismissed the petition, and Wiener appealed the adverse 
decision to the Supreme Court.166 
 A unanimous Supreme Court reversed.  Declaring in his opinion for the Court that the 
case presented “a variant of the constitutional issue decided in Humphrey’s Executor,” Justice 
Frankfurter reiterated that the Court in Humphrey’s Executor had narrowly confined the scope of 
the Myers decision to include only “‘all purely executive officers’” and had explicitly 
disapproved the dictum in Myers that the President has the inherent constitutional power to 
remove members of a quasi-judicial bodies: 
                                                
166 Id. at 350-351. 
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The assumption was short-lived that the Myers case recognized the President’s 
inherent constitutional power to remove officials, no matter what the relation of 
the executive to the discharge of their duties and no matter what restrictions 
Congress may have imposed regarding the nature of their tenure.167 
 
 “[T]he most reliable factor for drawing an inference regarding the President’s power of 
removal in [this] case,” Frankfurter wrote, thus “is the nature of the function that Congress 
vested in the War Claims Commission.”168  Characterizing that function as adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial in nature and noting that the WCC’s determinations were final and not reviewable by 
any court, Frankfurter concluded that the WCC—like the FTC in Humphrey’s Executor—had 
been intended by Congress to be “‘entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or 
indirect,’” of either the President or the Congress.169  Then, finding that “[t]he ground of 
President Eisenhower’s removal of [Wiener from the WCC] was precisely the same as President 
Roosevelt’s removal of Humphrey [from the FTC]” and that Wiener as a WCC commissioner 
had not exercised any purely executive powers, the Court concluded that just as the Court in 
Humphrey’s Executor had determined that no power to remove such an official is given to the 
President directly by the Constitution and that none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute, 
so, too, the Court in this case was compelled to conclude that the President had no such removal 
power even when, as here, Congress had said nothing in the War Claims Act about how and 
under what circumstances a WCC commissioner might be removed before the expiration of his 
tenure in office.  “The philosophy of Humphrey’s Executor, in its explicit language as well as its 
implications,” Justice Frankfurter wrote, “precludes such a claim.”170 
                                                
167 Id. at 352. 
168 Id. at 353. 
169 Id. at 355-356. 
170 Id. at 354, 356. 
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 By re-affirming the principles announced in Humphrey’s Executor the Court in Wiener 
thus “brought an authoritative end to questions regarding the extent of the [P]resident’s power to 
remove officeholders at his discretion alone.”171 
4. Buckley v. Valeo 
 Buckley v. Valeo172 dealt with the constitutionality of several provisions of the 1974 
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as amended, the “FEC Act”),173 
which created the Federal Election Commission (the “FEC”).  Under the FEC Act, the FEC was 
to be comprised of eight (8) members selected as follows:  two (2) non-voting members selected 
by the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of the House of Representatives; and six (6) voting 
members, to be confirmed by both the House of Representatives and Senate, comprised of two 
(2) appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate, two (2) appointed by the Speaker of the 
House, and two (2) appointed by the President of the United States.174  The statute vested the 
FEC with broad authority.  The commission, for instance, had rulemaking and adjudicative 
powers and served as a clearinghouse for information regarding federal elections.  The FEC’s 
adjudicative authority included the power to pursue civil legal actions to enforce and implement 
the FEC Act.175 
 The Court, in its per curiam opinion, broke down the FEC’s authority into three 
categories, as follows: (1) flow of information (receipt, dissemination and investigation); (2) 
fleshing out the statute (rulemaking); and (3) compliance (informal procedures and civil suits).176 
                                                
171 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 140, at 239. 
172 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
173 Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). 
174 Id. 
175 Buckley, 424 U.S at 109. 
176 Id. at 137. 
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The Court concluded that the functions comprising the first category, largely informative and 
investigatory, were justified but that those in the third category, enforcement, were not.  The 
Court held that the enforcement power of the FEC clearly violated the Appointments Clause 
because these were functions that should be carried out by “Officers of the United States.”177  
“[A]ny appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an 
‘Officer of the United States,’” the Court concluded, “and must, therefore, be appointed in the 
manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of ... Article [II].”178  Relying upon Myers and Ex parte 
Hennen,179 the Court concluded that FEC commissioners must be “at the very least, such 
‘inferior officers’ within the meaning of that Clause.”180  With regard to appointment, two 
classes of officers exist,181 and “[u]nless…elsewhere provided for, all officers of the United 
States are to be appointed in accordance with the [Appointments] Clause.”182  Even faced with its 
earlier decision in Humphrey’s Executor, the Court reiterated its view that, even when agencies 
are clearly intended by Congress to be independent of executive authority, “the members of 
[such] independent agencies are not independent of the Executive with respect to their 
appointments.”183   
5. Morrison v. Olson 
 Morrison v. Olson184 provides yet another approach to the Appointments Clause.  At 
issue in Morrison were the independent-counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 
                                                
177 Id. at 141. 
178 Id. at 126. 
179 Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839). 
180 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
181 See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509-510 (1879). 
182 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132. 
183 Id. at 133.  See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (applied Humphrey’s to the War Claims 
Commission, so the president could not remove members from this independent group at will). 
184 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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1978 (from time to time referred to as the “EGA”),185 which created an independent counsel to 
investigate and prosecute high-ranking Executive Branch officials for federal criminal violations.  
The EGA provided for the appointment by a special judicial panel (the “Special Division”) of an 
independent counsel upon a preliminary investigation by the Attorney General and after a 
determination by the Attorney General that such an appointment was warranted.  The EGA 
vested in the independent counsel the “full power and independent authority to exercise all 
investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice, the Attorney 
General, and any other officer or employee of the Department of Justice.”186  Congress retained 
no control over the independent counsel other than providing for periodic reports on his or her 
activities to be submitted to Congress and retaining the ultimate authority to impeach and remove 
him or her from office upon conviction.  The independent counsel could be removed, short of 
impeachment, in two ways: (1) by the Attorney General “for cause” and (2) upon the completion 
of the independent counsel’s investigation.   The Court of Appeals invalidated the Ethics in 
Government Act on various constitutional grounds, and the Supreme Court agreed to review the 
case.187 
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Morrison, written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
examined several issues.  First, the Court concluded that the independent counsel was an 
“inferior officer” for purposes of the Appointments Clause based upon consideration of the 
following factors: (1) the independent counsel could be removed by a higher Executive Branch 
official, (2) the independent counsel performed limited duties, (3) the jurisdiction of the 
independent counsel was limited, and (4) the tenure of the independent counsel was limited.  The 
Court made this determination, however, without defining what constitutes an “inferior officer” 
                                                
185 Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599. 
186 Id. at § 594 (a).  
187 See In re Sealed Case, 267 U.S. App. D.C. 178. 
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or a “principal officer” and without clearly delineating how one is distinguishable from the 
other.188 
A second issue in Morrison was whether the EGA’s providing for the interbranch 
appointment of the independent counsel by the special panel of federal judges violated the 
Excepting Clause of the Appointments Clause.  The Court initially noted that the Excepting 
Clause does not, on its face, prohibit interbranch appointments.  Moreover, by including the 
clause “as they think proper” in the Excepting Clause, the framers of Article II seemed “clearly 
to give Congress significant discretion to determine whether it is ‘proper’ to vest the appointment 
of . . . executive officials in the ‘courts of law.’”  Ultimately, therefore, the Court held that 
interbranch appointments are allowable under the Excepting Clause and that vesting authority for 
the appointment of the independent counsel in the Special Division was permissible.189 
 6. Freytag v. Commissioner 
Another major relevant case in the construction of the Excepting Clause portion of the 
Appointments Clause is Freytag v. Commissioner,190 in which the constitutionality of a 
congressional statutory provision authorizing the appointment of a special trial judge (formerly 
know as a “commissioner”191) appointed by the United States Tax Court (the “Tax Court”) was 
at issue.   
The chief judge of the Tax Court had the authority, by statute, to appoint special trial 
judges for certain types of complex litigation in that court.192  During review of the petitioners’ 
case in 1984, the chief judge of the Tax Court assigned a special judge to the case subsequent to 
the illness and retirement of the initial Tax Court judge.  The special trial judge, Carleton Powell, 
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found that the petitioners owed additional taxes, and the chief judge adopted the opinion of Judge 
Powell as that of the Tax Court.193  The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the argument of the 
petitioners was that the appointment of the special trial judge had been in violation of the 
Appointments Clause. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court emphasized that the Appointments Clause was not 
designed only or even primarily to protect Executive Branch prerogatives.  Justice Blackman 
wrote in the Court’s opinion that “[t]he Appointments Clause prevents Congress from dispensing 
power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint,…[and] the 
structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one Branch of 
government but of the entire Republic.”194  The Court went on to use Buckley to hold that the 
special trial judges are “inferior officers” for Appointments Clause purposes.  Rejecting the 
Commissioner’s assertion that the judges are mere employees who are not subject to the 
provisions of the Appointments Clause, the Court noted that the judges perform more than mere 
ministerial tasks, are given significant responsibility by law, and exercise “significant 
discretion.”195  The Court distinguished the case at hand from Morrison on the ground that 
Freytag did not involve an interbranch appointment.196 
The Court also rejected the Commissioner’s argument that “every part of the Executive 
Branch is a department the head of which is eligible to receive the appointment power” and held 
that the Tax Court “is not a ‘Department.’”197  In deciding that the Tax Court is not a department, 
however, the Court left open the question of what constitutes a “Head of Department”198 for 
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purposes of the Excepting Clause.  Instead, the Court ruled that the Tax Court was one of the 
“Courts of Law.”199  Justice Blackmun wrote that, despite traditionally having been viewed as 
part of the Executive Branch, “the Tax Court’s function and role…[resemble]…those of the 
federal district courts, which indisputably are ‘Courts of Law.’”200  Furthermore, the 
Appointments Clause “does not limit ‘the Courts of Law’ to those courts established under 
Article III of the Constitution.”201   
In his concurring opinion,202 Justice Scalia disagreed on this point, writing that “the 
definite article ‘the’ [in the Appointments Clause] obviously narrows the class of eligible ‘Courts 
of Law’ to those Courts or Law envisioned by the Constitution.  Those are Article III courts, and 
the Tax Court is not one of them.”203  Justice Scalia also considered what constitutes a 
“Department,” though he did not provide a clear standard.  While not binding, the language 
provided by Justice Scalia is important to one of the principal issues in the Free Enterprise Fund 
case.  He wrote: 
A number of factors support the proposition that “Heads of Departments” 
includes the heads of all agencies immediately below the President in the 
organizational structure of the Executive Branch…This evident meaning -- that 
the term “Departments” means all independent executive establishments -- is also 
the only construction that makes sense of Art. II, 2’s sharp distinction between 
principal officers and inferior officers…In short, there is no reason, in text, 
judicial decision, history or policy, to limit the phrase “the Heads of Departments” 
in the Appointments Clause to those officials who are members of the President’s 
Cabinet.204 
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If Justice Scalia were to have garnered a majority in Freytag, any non-Article III court would 
have been treated as a Department.205  Ultimately, despite the debate over classifying the Tax 
Court, the United States Supreme Court held that the appointment of the special trial judge had 
been valid under the Appointments Clause. 
7. Edmond v. United States 
 At issue in the most recent of the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause cases, Edmond 
v. United States,206 was the constitutionality of the appointment of civilian judges to the Coast 
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals (the “CGCCA”) by the Secretary of Transportation.  The 
CGCCA, which is composed of both military and civilian judges, hears appeals from decisions 
of court martial, and decisions by the CGCCA are reviewable by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces.  Because the military and civilian judges who served on the 
CGCCA at the time of the Edmond case had been designated by Congress as officers of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation207 and because of the Court’s decision in Weiss v. United States,208 
the Secretary of Transportation had reappointed the two civilian judges then serving on the 
CGCCA.209 
 Justice Scalia rejected the petitioners’ argument that Article 66(a) of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (the “UCMJ”)210 gives the Judge Advocate General exclusive authority to 
appoint the judges of the CGCCA.  Instead, Justice Scalia held that this provision of the UCMJ 
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concerns “not the appointment of Court of Criminal Appeals judges, but only their 
assignment”211 and that, accordingly, the Secretary of Transportation has the authority to appoint 
CGCCA judges.212  The Court then turned to the constitutionality of the Secretary’s 
appointments.  Using Appointments Clause precedent, Justice Scalia reiterated the Court’s long-
standing recognition that the Excepting Clause language had been added to the Constitution for 
the “obvious purpose [of] administrative convenience”213 and that, although several of the 
Court’s earlier cases had provided examples of “inferior officers,”214 the Court had not yet 
fashioned a set of controlling criteria for distinguishing between “inferior officers” and 
“principal officers.”  Rejecting the applicability of most of the factors that had been relied upon 
in Morrison to the facts in Edmond, Justice Scalia instead focused on the factor in Morrison that 
considers whether there is a relationship that exists between the officer in question and some 
higher ranking officer or officers below the President.   “[W]hether one is an ‘inferior’ officer,” 
Scalia wrote, 
depends on whether he has a superior.  It is not enough that other officers may be 
identified who formally maintain a higher rank, or possess responsibilities of a 
greater magnitude.  It that were the intention, the Constitution might have used 
the phrase “lesser officer.”  Rather, in the context of a clause designed to preserve 
political accountability relative to important government assignments, we think it 
evident that “inferior officers” are officers whose work is directed and supervised 
at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.215 
 
 Such a supervisory relationship exists, the Court found, between the CGCCA judges and 
both the Judge Advocate General (the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation was 
at the time, ex officio, the Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard), which has oversight and 
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removal authority with respect to the judges, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces, which exercises the power of judicial review over decisions by the judges of the 
CGCCA.216  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the CGCCA judges were inferior officers for 
purposes of the Appointments Clause.  “What is significant,” Scalia emphasized, 
is that the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals have no power to render a final 
decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other 
executive officers.217 
 
 The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the CGCCA judges more closely 
resemble Tax Court judges (who the Court in Morrison, according to the petitioners, implied 
were principal officers) than they do the special trial judges whose appointments were at issue in 
Morrison.  “We note initially,” Justice Scalia wrote, 
that Freytag does not hold that Tax Court judges are principal officers; only the 
appointment of special trial judges was at issue in that case.  Moreover, there are 
two significant distinctions between Tax Court judges and Court of Criminal 
Appeals judges.  First, there is no Executive Branch tribunal comparable to the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces that reviews the work of the Tax Court; its 
decisions are appealable only to courts of the Third Branch [i.e., the federal 
judiciary under Article III].  And second, there is no officer comparable to a Judge 
Advocate General who supervises the work of the Tax Court, with power to 
determine its procedural rules, to remove any judge without cause, and to order 
any decision submitted for review.  Freytag does not control our decision 
here.218 
 
 The Court determined, therefore, that, because the judges are inferior officers and 
because Congress had properly authorized the Secretary of Transportation to appoint the 
CGCCA judges in question, the appointments were constitutional under the Appointments 
Clause.219 
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C. The Separation-of-Powers Issues 
 Because of its significance as a tool for control, the power to remove governmental 
officers can also raise significant separation-of-powers issues. 
 The Supreme Court stated the obvious when in 1983 it noted that “[t]he Constitution 
sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined 
categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.”220  The purpose of this separation-of-powers 
feature of the Constitution was to “diffus[e] power the better to secure liberty,”221 a purpose 
echoed by James Madison in Federalist No. 47 when he wrote that “[t]he accumulation of all 
powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many . . . 
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”222  Although the Constitution’s 
diffusion of power among the three branches can produce “conflicts, confusion, and 
discordance” within the government, “it was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous, 
and open debate on the great issues affecting the people, and to provide avenues for the operation 
of checks on the exercise of governmental power.”223 
 The Supreme Court first comprehensively addressed the separation-of-powers 
ramifications of the removal power in Myers, in which Chief Justice Taft, in his opinion for the 
Court, declared unconstitutional the statute requiring Senate approval of the President’s exercise 
of the power to remove a postmaster on the ground that for Congress to retain the power to 
participate in the exercise of such power “would be . . . to infringe [upon] the constitutional 
principle of the separation of governmental powers.”224  In its subsequent decision in 
Humphrey’s Executor, the Court reiterated “the crucial role of separated powers in our 
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system”225 when it sustained the constitutionality of congressional limitations on the President’s 
power to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission: 
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments 
of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or 
indirect, of either of the others has often been stressed, and is hardly open to 
serious question.  So much is implied in the very fact of the separation of the 
powers of these departments by the Constitution, and in the rule which recognizes 
their essential co-equality.226 
 
 Of special concern to the framers of the Constitution were the dangers of congressional 
usurpation of the functions of the Executive Branch.  As the Court observed in Bowsher: 
[T]he debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are 
replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the National 
Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches.227 
 
 Hardly more than a half-century later, the Court revisited the separation-of-powers 
repercussions of the removal power in Bowsher v. Synar. 
1. Bowsher v. Synar 
 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (the “Balanced Budget 
Act”)228 vested in the Comptroller General the authority to take certain steps to control the 
federal budget deficit.  Specifically, each year the directors of the Office of Management and 
Budget (the “OMB”) and the Congressional Budget Office (the “CBO”) were required to prepare 
independent estimates of the amount of the anticipated federal budget deficit for the ensuing 
fiscal year and if the projected deficit exceeded the maximum targeted deficit amount designated 
by the Balanced Budget Act for that fiscal year by more than a specified amount, the directors of 
the OMB and the CBO were to calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget reductions 
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that would be necessary to ensure that the deficit for that fiscal year did not exceed the maximum 
targeting deficit amount.  The Balanced Budget Act further provided that the directors of the 
OMB and the CBO then were to submit a joint report containing their deficit estimates and 
budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General, who, after having reviewed the same, 
was directed to report his conclusions to the President, who in turn was required to order the 
spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General.229  Bowsher v. Synar challenged the 
constitutionality of this feature of the Balanced Budget Act on several grounds, including an 
assertion that the statute violated the separation-of-powers feature of the Constitution. 
 Central to the Bowsher case was the removability of the Comptroller General, an officer 
who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate but who, by statute is removable 
only by Congress, either by impeachment or by joint resolution based on certain specified 
grounds.230  Chief Justice Warrant Burger’s opinion for the Court found that the Comptroller 
General had consistently over an extended period of time been viewed as part of the Legislative 
Branch and concluded that this arrangement, coupled with the congressional removal provisions, 
meant that the Comptroller General could not exercise executive powers.231  The Court 
determined, however, that the Balanced Budget Act had vested the Comptroller General with 
executive power, since he could “exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application 
of the Act...[and] must interpret…the Act”232 before mandating what cuts the President was 
required to make.  “Decisions of that kind,” the Court observed, “are typically made by officers 
charged with executing a statute.”233  After passing the Balanced Budget Act, in other words, 
Congress, in effect, had impermissibly attempted to retain control over enforcement of the Act, 
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since one of its own officers—the Comptroller General—was charged with carrying out the 
statute’s mandates,234 and, simply put, Congress must not retain control over any executive 
functions.  The Court thus affirmed the decision by a special three-judge panel of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia invalidating the Balanced Budget Act.235  The Court, 
rather than perform “statutory surgery,”236 elected to allow the Balanced Budget Act’s fallback 
provisions237 go into effect and stayed the judgment for no more than 60 days.238 
2. Morrison v. Olson 
 The Court in Morrison also held that the Government in Ethics Act did undermine the 
Executive Branch, so no separation-of-powers problem existed.  Distinguishing the case from 
Bowsher, the Court noted that, here, Congress was not trying impermissibly to retain control 
over the execution of a statute.  With regard to removal power, the Court characterized the case 
as being more like Humphrey’s Executor than Myers.239  The appellees argued the case was 
different from Humphrey’s Executor because the independent counsel, unlike an FTC 
commissioner, performed a “core executive function.”240  Significantly, however, the Court 
chose not to define what “core executive function” is.  Moreover, the Court was of the view that 
the determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a “good 
cause”-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot be 
made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as “purely executive.”  
The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid 
categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the 
President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s 
exercise of the “executive power” and his constitutionally appointed duty to “take 
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care that the laws be faithfully executed” under Article II.  Myers was 
undoubtedly correct in its holding, and in its broader suggestion that there are 
some “purely executive” officials who must be removable by the President at will 
if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role.  But as the Court noted in 
Wiener: 
 
 The assumption was short-lived that the Myers case recognized the 
President’s inherent constitutional power to remove officials no matter 
what the relation of the executive to the discharge of their duties and no 
matter what restrictions Congress may have imposed regarding the nature 
of their tenure. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum from Myers, the characterization of the agencies 
in Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener as “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” in 
large part reflected our judgment that it was not essential to the President’s proper 
execution of his Article II powers that these agencies be headed up by individuals 
who were removable at will.  We do not mean to suggest that an analysis of the 
functions served by the officials at issue is irrelevant.  But the real question is 
whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the 
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the 
officials in question must be analyzed in that light. 
 
. . . . 
 
This is not a case in which the power to remove an executive official has been 
completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the President 
to ensure the “faithful execution” of the laws.  Rather, because the independent 
counsel may be terminated for “good cause,” the Executive, through the Attorney 
General, retains ample authority to assure that the counsel is competently 
performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the 
provisions of the [Ethics in Government] Act.241 
 
 The Morrison Court, therefore, held that it did not violate the Appointments Clause for 
Congress to vest appointment of the independent counsel in the Special Division; that the powers 
granted to the Special Division under the EAG did not violate Article III of the Constitution; and 
that the EAG did not violate the separation-of-powers feature of the Constitution by 
impermissibly interfering with the functions of the Executive Branch.242 
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D. The Accountability Issue 
 Related but at the same time collateral to the separation-of-powers issues is the separate 
issue of whether, and if so the extent to which, Congress might be free to render independent 
agencies “unaccountable to the public through a democratically-elected branch of 
government.”243  As one commentator has noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in “Morrison on 
its face leaves Congress tremendous leeway to configure independent agencies in a manner that 
severs them from traditional mechanisms of accountability.”244 
 In his opinion for the Court in Edmond, Justice Scalia noted, “By requiring the joint 
participation of the President and the Senate, the Appointments Clause was designed to ensure 
public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good 
one.”245  The rationale for such accountability, according to Justice Scalia, was provided by 
Alexander Hamilton in his Federalist No. 77 essay: 
The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the president singly and 
absolutely.  The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of 
the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good 
intentions of the executive.  If an ill appointment should be made, the executive 
for nominating, and the senate for approving, would participate, though in 
different degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.246 
 
 Justice Scalia’s observation was made in obvious reference to the provisions of the 
Appointments Clause relating to principal officers whose appointments are required to be made 
by the President by and with the consent of the Senate and not in connection with the Excepting 
Clause.  The cases do not provide a clear answer to the question of whether, as a constitutional 
requirement, the notion of accountability must extend beyond Presidential political answerability 
for the actions of principal officers within the Executive Branch and extend to answerability for 
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the actions of every one of the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of inferior officers—regardless of 
whether appointed by the President, by the heads of departments, or by the courts of law—within 
the federal government, as opposed to all inferior officers within the Executive Branch. 
 At least one noted constitutional scholar has suggested that perhaps the political 
accountability doctrine should, indeed, extend at least to those lower-level inferior officers 
within the federal government who are appointed by persons who are themselves not accountable 
politically to the President or to anyone who is accountable to the President.  Professor Laurence 
H. Tribe has described the potential problem in the following manner: 
[I]n the particular situation in which an inferior officer is appointed by persons 
who are themselves not politically accountable . . . ongoing supervision by a 
politically accountable official, whether by the President or by someone serving at 
the President’s pleasure, seems particularly important.  In such circumstances, 
where there is little or no political accountability at the front end for the choice of 
that officer, a ‘for cause’ limitation on removal that renders political supervision 
impossible appears troubling from an accountability perspective.247 
 
 A statement by Justice John Paul Stevens in his now “famous opinion” for the Court in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council248 has led to some speculation that 
the doctrine of political accountability does (or should) extend at least to inferior officers serving 
in agencies within the Executive Branch.249  At issue in the Chevron case was a question under 
administrative law of whether the intermediate appellate court, rather than the applicable 
administrative agency, had properly construed the definition of a term contained in a rule 
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (the “EPA”) in the light of certain 
amendments to the Clean Air Act that were enacted in 1977.  Before concluding that the 
appellate court had erred, Justice Stevens observed that the statutory amendments had 
represented an attempt on the part of Congress to accommodate “the economic interest in 
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permitting capital improvements to continue and the environmental interest in improving air 
quality”; that the subsequent rules promulgated by the EPA (including those under challenge) 
reflected a change in policy brought about by a change in presidential administrations in 1981; 
and that the ultimate remedy sought by the respondents, an environmental advocacy group, lay 
with the two political branches of the government, i.e., the President or Congress, and not with 
the judiciary.  The truism articulated by Justice Stevens (with the language that has given rise to 
the suggestion that the political accountability doctrine should apply to agencies within the 
Executive Branch highlighted in italics) occurs in the following context: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the 
Government.  Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, 
but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.  In contrast, an 
agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, 
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.  While agencies 
are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is 
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the government to make such 
policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency 
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.  When 
a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly 
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than 
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the 
challenge must fail.  In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.  The 
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the 
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:  
“Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”250 
 
One way of interpreting Justice Stevens’s observation, of course, is that it appears in a decision 
that was not concerned with the constitutional aspects of the accountability doctrine and that it 
was intended to be merely a statement of political reality and not a statement of binding 
constitutional principle. 
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 Even assuming, however, that Justice Stevens’s statement in Chevron does, indeed, 
amount to a statement of binding constitutional principle and that, by application of that principle 
to inferior officers appointed under the Excepting Clause of the Appointments Clause, the 
accountability doctrine does, indeed, apply to inferior officers serving within independent 
agencies, then the issues in each such case would be, first, whether such officer is appointed by 
persons who are indeed, in Professor Tribe’s words, “themselves not politically accountable” 
and, second, if so, whether there is “ongoing supervision” of such official “by a politically 
accountable official.”251 
E. The Burden of Persuasion 
 Alexander Bickel once argued that 
when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act . . ., it thwarts 
the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises 
control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.  That, without 
mystic overtones, is what actually happens. . . . [I]t is the reason the charge can be 
made that judicial review is undemocratic.252 
 
Because judicial review is thus inherently countermajoritarian, the courts have fashioned a 
number of doctrines that have as their purpose the limiting of the exercise of judicial power and 
that reflect “an underlying philosophy of judicial restraint.”  Perhaps the most fundamental of 
these doctrines is the “presumption of constitutionality,” under which  
courts will presume a challenged statute is valid until it is demonstrated 
otherwise.  In other words, the party attacking the validity of the law carries the 
burden of proof.  This doctrine is based on an appreciation for the 
countermajoritarian character of judicial review and a fundamental respect for the 
legislative bodies in a democratic system.253 
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 Consistent with the presumption-of-constitutionality doctrine is one of the now famous 
Ashwander Rules identified by Justice Louis D. Brandeis in 1936, which provides as follows: 
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a 
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court 
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which 
the question may be avoided.254 
 
 Also consistent with both the presumption-of-constitutionality doctrine and Ashwander 
Rule No. 7 is the judicially created distinction between “facial” constitutional challenges and 
“as-applied” constitutional challenges. 
The constitutionality of an act of Congress may be tested in either a “facial” challenge or 
in an “as-applied” challenge.255  The Supreme Court has recently observed that the distinction 
between the two types of constitutional challenges is “both instructive and necessary, for it goes 
to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court.”256  The normal mode of constitutional 
adjudication involves an as-applied challenge, in which a party argues that a statute cannot be 
applied to him or her because its application would violate his or her constitutional rights.257  In a 
facial challenge, the court is asked to vindicate a party’s right not to be bound by a statute that is 
unconstitutional on its face, i.e., because its very enactment is inconsistent with some express 
provision, or violates some express prohibition, of the Constitution.258  Within the customary 
understanding of the distinction, facial attacks maintaining that a statute is generally invalid, as 
opposed to invalid as applied to the challenger, have been considered “rare and suspect.”259  As 
the Supreme Court has noted, “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult 
                                                
254 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Ashwander Rule 
No. 7) (citations omitted). 
255 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1321, 1339 (2000). 
256 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 876, 893 (2010). 
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258 See United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 477-478 (1995). 
259 See Fallon, supra note 255, at 1339. 
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challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances 
exists under which the Act would be valid.”260 
IV. The Free Enterprise Fund Case 
 This challenge to the constitutionality of the PCAOB started after the Board inspected a 
small, regional accounting firm based in Nevada in 2004.  Firms with less than 100 public 
company audit clients are subject to PCAOB inspection at least every three years.261  This was 
the firm’s first inspection by the PCAOB.     
A. Facts 
 Beckstead and Watts, LLP (“B&W” or the “Firm”) is a small accounting firm 
headquartered in Henderson, Nevada.262  B&W is a “small ‘niche’ audit firm serving the needs 
of ‘micro-cap’ and ‘development stage’ companies.”263  B&W is subject to PCAOB inspection 
pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.264  A PCAOB inspection team conducted fieldwork in the 
Nevada office of the Firm from May 17, 2004, through May 18, 2004.265  The inspection 
involved a review of sixteen financial statement audits completed for B&W clients.266  The 
PCAOB report provided that: 
The inspection team identified matters that it considered to be audit deficiencies.  
The deficiencies identified in eight of the audits reviewed included deficiencies of 
such significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm did not 
obtain sufficient competent evidential matter to support its opinion on the issuers' 
financial statements. Those deficiencies included – 
(1) the failure to perform and document sufficient procedures to analyze the 
appropriate accounting treatment for an acquisition of a rental property; 
(2) the failure in two audits to perform and document sufficient procedures to 
evaluate the recorded balance of capitalized software costs for impairment despite 
                                                
260 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
261 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 104 (b)(B). 
262 See http://www.becksteadwatts.com/. 
263 Inspection of Beckstead and Watts, LLP, PCAOB Release No. 104-2005-082, at 10 (2005). 
264 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §104. 
265 Inspection, supra note 263, at 4 (report indicated that B&W had one office, one partner, two professional staff, 
and sixty-one clients). 
266 Id. at 5.  
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the presence of factors indicating potential impairment; 
(3) the failure in three audits to perform and document sufficient procedures to 
test the fair value of equity securities issued in several transactions; 
(4) the failure in two audits to perform and document sufficient procedures to test 
liabilities for completeness and accuracy; 
(5) the failure to perform and document sufficient procedures to test the 
appropriateness of the issuer's revenue recognition; 
(6) the failure to perform and document sufficient procedures to test the valuation 
of an expense recorded upon the termination of an agreement; 
(7) the failure to perform and document sufficient procedures to test the 
collectibility of a note receivable despite evidence of impairment; and 
(8) the failure in two audits to perform and document an adequate evaluation with 
respect to the issuers' ability to continue as a going concern.267 
 
The PCAOB inspection team also evaluated the quality of the control system of B&W.268  Any 
deficiencies in this portion of the report were, by rule, confidential and not to be reported to the 
public for twelve months.269  In 2007, the PCAOB issued a clearance letter to the Firm 
acknowledging that “the Firm [had] addressed the quality control criticisms or defects described 
in the Board’s September 28, 2005 inspection report to the satisfaction of the Board.”270  This 
letter meant that the Firm had made “good faith progress toward achieving . . . quality control 
objectives”271 and that, consequently, the Board’s criticisms and any defects identified by the 
Board would remain private. 
 Firms are allowed to review and comment on their PCAOB reports.272  In their response, 
B&W characterized the PCAOB’s 2004 inspection as having been “overwhelming for [their] 
small office.”273  The Firm acknowledged the inherent risk in micro-cap and developmental stage 
companies but contended that investors knew this and would either “embrace [the] level of risk . 
                                                
267 Id. at 5-6. 
268 Id. at 6. 
269 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 104(g)(2) and 105(b)(5)(A). 
270 Clearance Letter from PCAOB to B&W (June 15, 2007), available at http://www. 
becksteadwatts.com/files/Clearance_ltr_dated_6-25-07.pdf. 
271 Id. 
272 Sarbanes-Oxley § 104(f); see 15 U.S.C. § 7214(f) and PCAOB Rule 4007(a)). 
273 Inspection, supra note 263, at 10. 
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. . or avoid it by investing their dollars elsewhere.”274  The Firm noted that many of its clients 
had “going-concern” audit reports.275  Finally, the Firm addressed the costs of compliance with 
SOX and distinguished their clients, which, it should be noted, traded on the Over-the-Counter 
Bulletin Board Exchange,276 from Fortune 1000 companies.  The Firm wrote, in part, that: 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) has tremendously impacted our firm’s 
ability to compete in the small business issuer marketplace….  When the “Big 
Four” accounting firms double their fees, their multi-national clients absorb the 
costs; when we double our fees, our clients go out of business.  It is thus a 
constant struggle for us to perform audits in conformity with the requirements of 
SOX.  If the Board were to simply ignore these cost and efficacy issues, this 
segment of the market likely will not be able to remain in existence. 
 
. . . We found the inspectors evaluated our audits in the same manner one might 
evaluate the audits of Fortune 1000 companies. . . . 
 
[T]he SEC is and always has been aware of the micro-cap/development stage 
market segment in which we work, and has allowed that segment to endure.  It is 
our belief that effectively eliminating that segment of the market should not be a 
collateral consequence of the Board’s inspection process; rather, if anyone should 
decide the fate of that segment of the market, it should be the SEC.277 
 
B&W took action to respond to the PCAOB inspection and expectations.  The 2007 clearance 
letter is evidence of this action; however, as a result, B&W reduced its client base from over 
sixty companies to approximately ten.278 
 The Firm was again inspected by the PCAOB in 2008, and a report was issued in 2009.279  
This report was much more succinct than the 2005 report.  The inspection involved the review of 
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listed on other, national exchanges (e.g., NYSE or NASDAQ).   
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an audit for one issuer, and no audit performance issues were reported.280  As with the earlier 
report, any control criticisms or defects were kept confidential.  There was no comment from the 
B&W in the 2009 report. 
 The Free Enterprise Fund281 (the “Fund”), a plaintiff in the case, “is a non-profit public-
interest organization under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code.  [The Fund] 
promotes economic growth, lower taxes, and limited government through… advertising 
campaigns…[and] policy guidance.”282  The identities of the members of the Fund are not 
disclosed in any of the applicable pleadings or other court documents, although B&W is named 
as a member of Fund in the opinion of the court of appeals.283 
B. Procedural History 
1. The District Court 
On February 7, 2006, after the PCAOB’s 2004 inspection and investigation, B&W and 
the Fund filed a complaint against the Board and four individuals in their capacities as members 
of the PCAOB in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.284  The plaintiffs 
presented a facial constitutional challenge285 to “the formation and operation of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board,” asserting that the PCAOB provisions of SOX violate 
both “the Constitution’s separation of powers principles and the Appointments Clause.” 286  The 
plaintiffs argued that “[t]he Board’s exercise of wide-ranging, core executive power, immune 
                                                
280 Id. at 5. 
281 See http://www.fefund.org; Jacob Gershman, Mallory Factor Decamps New York, Surprising Many, NEW YORK 
SUN, Aug. 15, 2006 (regarding Free Enterprise Fund Chairman Mallory Factor); David D. Kirpatrick, Leadership 
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from Presidential oversight, impermissibly impedes and undermines the President’s ability to 
perform his constitutional duties and prerogatives.  As a result, the creation of the Board, as well 
as its implementation of its delegated responsibilities under the Act, violates the separation of 
powers.”287  The plaintiffs also alleged that SOX improperly delegates legislative power outside 
the Legislative Branch.288   
With regard to the alleged violation of the Appointments Clause, the plaintiffs asserted 
that members of the PCAOB are principal officers and, accordingly, must be appointed by the 
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.  In the alternative, the plaintiffs 
argued that members of the PCAOB are inferior officers that must be appointed by the President, 
courts of law, or heads of departments.  The plaintiffs contended further that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission is not a department for purposes of the Appointments Clause.  
Compounding the alleged violation of the Appointments Clause, the plaintiffs asserted, are 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that the SEC consult with the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury and SOX’s 
limitations on the number of Board members who may be appointed from the accounting 
profession.289 
The plaintiffs requested that the district court invalidate the PCAOB provisions of SOX 
as unconstitutional and issue an injunction barring the PCAOB from any further proceedings 
against B&W.  Their prayer for relief also asked the court to nullify any prior adverse action by 
the Board against B&W.290 
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The defendants filed pre-trial motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint and, in the 
alternative, for summary judgment.  In their motions to dismiss, the defendants asserted a lack of 
standing on the part of the plaintiffs and a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The defendants’ 
standing argument was based on several grounds, the most significant of which was that the 
Fund had not alleged that it had sustained any specific injury.  The defendants’ jurisdictional 
argument also was based on numerous grounds, the most important of which was that the 
plaintiffs had by-passed the exclusive process of review of the PCAOB’s actions prescribed by 
SOX and had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.  District Judge James Robertson 
denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss but granted the defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment.  In a relatively short, unreported memorandum opinion, Judge Robertson initially 
found that the defendants had essentially conceded the standing of B&W and that the Fund 
likewise had standing because at least one of its members (B&W) was being regulated by the 
PCAOB.  Judge Robertson then concluded that the plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenges, 
which targeted the very structure of the PCAOB, were collateral to SOX’s statutory scheme and 
were, therefore, “outside the universe of cases subject to the implicitly exclusive administrative 
review established by [SOX].”291 
 Addressing the cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Robertson noted that all the 
parties had agreed that, for purposes of these motions, the PCAOB should be considered and 
treated as a governmental entity.292  Then, relying heavily upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Edmond, the court concluded that the members of the PCAOB are inferior officers because they 
“‘have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do 
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so by other executive officers,’ and are subject to administrative oversight and removal authority 
by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.”293 
 The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers argument on the ground that 
the Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution requires the President to maintain direct 
removal power over inferior officers and that here, as in Morrison, the President has not been 
“‘completely stripped’ of his ability to remove PCAOB members.”294  Finally, Judge Robertson 
concluded that Congress had not, as alleged by the plaintiffs, unlawfully delegated legislative 
power to the PCAOB in violation of Article I of the Constitution because SOX, in authorizing 
regulation by the Board in the public interest, had properly prescribed intelligible standards that 
the PCAOB is required to apply in exercising its regulatory powers.295 
 In ruling against the plaintiffs, Judge Robertson concluded his opinion by asserting that 
they had presented “nothing but an [sic] hypothetical scenario of an over-zealous or rogue 
PCAOB investigator.”296 
2. The Court of Appeals 
 The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s adverse decision to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,297 which affirmed, 2-1, the lower court’s ruling.298  
                                                
293 Id. at 4.  The court then effectively eliminated as an issue in the case the plaintiffs’ alternative argument in their 
cross-motion for summary judgment that, even if PCAOB members are inferior officers, their appointment by the 
SEC is unconstitutional because the SEC is not a “department” for purposes of the Excepting Clause of the 
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appointed.  Id. 
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Circuit Judge Judith Rogers initially reviewed the lower court’s denial of the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss and held that the district court had properly denied that motion.  Because this was a 
facial challenge of SOX, the circuit court reasoned, the plaintiffs’ failure to use the 
administrative review procedures prescribed by SOX was not dispositive and thus the 
“exhaustion doctrine [did] not apply.”299  Indeed, as the circuit court had held in Time Warner 
Entertainment Co. v. FCC, a district court has “general federal question jurisdiction to consider a 
facial challenge to a statute's constitutionality so long as that challenge is not raised in a suit 
challenging the validity of agency action taken pursuant to the challenged statute or in a suit that 
is collateral to one challenging the validity of such agency action.”300 
Turning to the district court’s granting of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 
Judge Rogers relied upon Edmond to hold that the PCAOB members are inferior officers: 
“Generally speaking, the term ‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some 
higher ranking officer or officers below the President:  Whether one is an 
‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior.  Under this standard, the 
Board is composed of officers inferior to the Commission.  The Commissioners . . 
. are “appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the 
Senate,” and they exercise comprehensive control over Board procedures and 
decisions and Board members.  For instance, the Commission approves all Board 
rules, and may abrogate, delete, or add to them.  All Board sanctions are subject 
to plenary review by the Commission, and the Commission “may enhance, 
modify, cancel, reduce, or require the remission of a sanction imposed by the 
Board.”  As such, the Board’s disciplinary authority “ultimately belongs to the 
[Commission], and the legal views of the [Board] must yield to the Commission’s 
view of the law.”  The Commission both appoints and removes Board members.  
It also may impose limitations upon Board activities and relieve the Board of its 
enforcement authority altogether. 
 
. . . . Contrary to the Fund’s suggestion, the fact that the Board is charged with 
exercising extensive authority on behalf of the United States does not mean that 
                                                
297 PCAOB II, 537 F. 3d 667.  The plaintiffs, however, did not pursue their non-delegation claim on appeal.  Id. at 
670 n.2. 
298 Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F. 3d at 668. 
299 PCAOB II, 537 F. 3d at 671; see Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 104 (h)(1), 107 (c) (establishing procedures for 
Commission review of disciplinary action taken by the PCAOB)).  
300 Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F. 3d 957, 965 (D.C Cir. 1996). 
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Board members must be appointed by the President, for principal as well as 
inferior officers, by definition, “ ‘exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the 
laws of the United States.’”  Instead, what is key under the Edmond analysis is the 
fact that Board members “have no power to render a final decision on behalf of 
the United States unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers.  [SOX] 
vests a broad range of duties in the Board, but its exercise of those duties is 
subject to check by the Commission at every significant step.301    
 
Moreover, the majority held, PCAOB members are subject to greater oversight than both the 
Coast Guard judges in Edmond and the independent counsel in Morrison.302   
 Rejecting the Fund’s argument that the for-cause limitation on the Commission’s removal 
power requires that Board members be deemed principal, rather than inferior, officers, the circuit 
court observed that such a suggestion “overinflates the importance of removal authority”: 
Recognizing that “[t]he power to remove officers . . . is a powerful tool for 
control,” the Supreme Court has indicated that courts should consider removal 
authority as one factor in determining whether an official is an inferior officer.  
The Court has held that both the Coast Guard Judges in Edmond, who were 
subject to the Judge Advocate General’s at-will removal authority, and the 
Independent Counsel in Morrison, who was subject to removal only for cause, 
were inferior officers.  Here, [SOX] vests removal authority in the Commission, 
providing that “[a] member of the Board may be removed by the Commission 
from office . . . for good cause shown.”  Just as in Morrison, “the fact that [Board 
members] can be removed by the [Commission] indicates that [they are] to some 
degree ‘inferior’ in rank and authority.” 
 
The Supreme Court has expressly permitted legislatively-imposed limitations on 
executive officers’ removal authority: 
 
We have no doubt that when congress, by law, vests the 
appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, it may 
limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the 
public interest.  The constitutional authority in congress to thus 
vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and 
regulate the removal by such laws as congress may enact in 
relation to the officers so appointed.303 
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302 PCAOB II, 537 F. 3d at 672. 
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 Responding to the assertion by the dissenting circuit judge that an officer removable only 
for cause is ordinarily not “directed and supervised” for purposes of Edmond unless the statute 
expressly provides either (1) that the officer can be removed for failing to follow a supervisor’s 
direction and supervision, or (2) that a superior officer other than the President has authority to 
manage—on a before-the-fact basis—the ongoing conduct of all of the officer’s exercises of 
executive authority (such as conducting investigations and taking enforcement actions), Judge 
Rogers noted that nothing in Edmond suggests that the appropriate supervisor’s direction and 
supervision requires managing the officer’s ongoing conduct of every day-to-day function and 
that, even under the dissenting judge’s suggested “novel” test, the PCAOB provisions of SOX 
would survive scrutiny because the statute mandates that “all of the Board’s duties are ‘subject to 
action by the Commission.’”304  As for the dissent’s position that the Board’s decisions 
concerning inspections, investigations, and enforcement actions cannot be prevented, 
affirmatively commanded, and managed by the Commission before such decisions are made, the 
majority observed that, first, SOX requires the Board to inspect all registered public accounting 
firms in accordance with a predetermined schedule that can be modified by the Board only by 
rule pre-approved by the SEC (i.e., the Board does not have the discretion not to inspect any 
particular firm) and to issue an inspection report, which is subject to SEC review at the request of 
any inspected firm; second, SOX preserves the SEC’s own investigative authority and authorizes 
the SEC not to affirmatively command an investigation by the Board, which means that the 
Board may not usurp the SEC’s investigative authority; and third, “and most important,” because 
the Board must establish by rule “fair procedures for the investigation and disciplining” of 
accounting firms and individuals and because no such rule shall become effective without prior 
SEC approval, the SEC is empowered by SOX to modify the Board’s investigative authority as it 
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sees fit and may mandate “that all decisions regarding investigation or enforcement actions 
against a firm be approved by the Commission.”  Discounting the significance of dissent’s 
distinction between managerial control exercised before the officer has taken an action and 
managerial control exercised after the officer has acted, Judge Rogers emphasized that the 
significant point is that, “‘[a]s in Edmond, any sanctions imposed by the Board are ‘subject to 
review by the ‘Commission’ before the decisions t[ake] effect on the accused.’”305 
 The Circuit Court also rejected the Fund’s contention, even assuming that Board 
members are inferior officers, that the SEC is not a department and the SEC commissioners are 
not the “head” of such a department for purposes of the Excepting Clause of the Appointments 
Clause.  Judge Rogers noted that although no definition of “Heads of Departments” has yet been 
provided, the Supreme Court has explained that the term “Departments” refers to “‘the 
subdivision of the power of the Executive into departments, for the more convenient exercise of 
that power’”; that “Departments” are “ ‘like the Cabinet-level departments’” but not limited to 
cabinet-level departments; and that the four concurring justices in Freytag urged that the term be 
understood to encompass “ ‘all agencies immediately below the President in the organizational 
structure of the Executive Branch,’ including ‘all independent executive establishments.’”306  
The majority of the circuit judges determined that the SEC is “Cabinet-like” because it exercises 
“executive authority over a major aspect of government policy” and that, given the Supreme 
Court’s acknowledgment in cases like Humphrey’s Executor of the constitutionality of 
independent agencies like the FTC and the SEC, “such entities must be able to constitutionally 
exercise appointment authority to permit their proper functioning.”307  Quoting with approval 
from an Attorney General’s Opinion from 1933 concerning the Civil Service Commission, the 
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majority opined that the SEC, too, is “ ‘not a subordinate Commission attached to one of the so-
called executive departments but is in itself an independent division of the Executive Branch of 
the Government with certain independent duties and functions’” and concluded that, as Congress 
has authorized the SEC to appoint officers and employees, “it would be illogical to handicap its 
ability to effectuate its statutory mandate because of the very independence that Congress has 
deemed necessary and the Supreme Court has deemed constitutional.”308 
 The majority also determined that the SEC commissioners, as a group, collectively 
exercise the same final authority as is vested in a single head of an executive department and 
thus qualify as one of the “Heads of Departments” for Appointments Clause purposes.  
Analogizing the SEC commissioners to the nine governors of the U. S. Postal Service (the 
“USPS”) and relying upon a decision by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the 
governors of the USPS constitute its “head” and that “ ‘Congress carefully vested ultimate 
control and authority of the Postal Service in the Governors,’” the majority concluded that “[t]he 
same is true here” and noted that the Fund had cited no authority suggesting that the framers of 
the Constitution had intended to foreclose Congress from granting multi-member commissions 
the authority to appoint inferior officers under the Excepting Clause of the Appointments 
Clause.309  Hence, the Court of Appeals held that, because Board members are inferior officers 
and because the SEC is a department whose head consists collectively of the SEC’s 
commissioners, the provision of SOX authorizing the SEC commissioners to appoint the 
members of the PCAOB does not violate the Appointments Clause.310 
 Addressing the separation-of-powers portion of the plaintiffs’ claim, the Court of Appeals 
characterized that challenge not as an assertion that Congress or the federal judiciary had 
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impermissibly encroached on the President’s appointment, removal, or decision-making 
authority “by aggrandizing their own powers,” but rather as an argument that SOX had 
impermissibly effected “an excessive attenuation of Presidential control over the Board”: 
The crux of the Fund’s challenge – that the double for-cause limitation on 
removal makes it impossible for the President to perform his duties – is a question 
of first impression as neither the Supreme Court nor this court has considered a 
situation where a restriction on removal passes through two levels of control.  But 
. . . [t]he removal power does not operate in a vacuum; rather it is one of several 
criteria [identified by Morrison as] relevant to assessing limits on the President’s 
ability to exercise Executive power.311 
 
The Supreme Court, Judge Rogers noted, “has long recognized that some types of restrictions on 
Presidential authority within the Executive Branch are permissible, especially in the case of 
independent agencies.”312 In Morrison, for instance, the Court had determined that “ ‘the real 
question [is] whether . . . the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty’ to ‘take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed’ was impeded” and had concluded that, in the light of the 
Attorney General’s ability to remove the independent counsel for cause, her limited jurisdiction 
and tenure, and her lack of policy-making authority, congressional “restrictions on the ‘amount 
of control or supervision’ that the President ultimately exercised over the functions of the 
Independent Counsel were constitutional given the ‘several means of supervising or controlling 
the . . . powers that may be wielded.’”313 
 The dual for-cause feature of the removal provisions applicable to Board members under 
SOX are entirely consistent with Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison, the Court of Appeals held.  
The nature and extent of the controls exercised by the SEC over the Board and the President’s 
ability to remove SEC commissioners for cause, the court concluded, do not mean that the 
President’s ability to carry out his Executive responsibilities are unconstitutionally restricted.  
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“When assessed in the context of the restrictions on Presidential power upheld in Morrison,” the 
court averred, “the President’s powers under [SOX] extend comfortably beyond the minimum 
required to ‘perform his constitutionally assigned duties.’  Although the President does not 
directly select or supervise the Board’s members, the President possesses significant influence 
over the Commission, which in turn possesses comprehensive control over the Board.” Thus 
rejecting the plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers challenge “[b]ecause of the reality of the 
President’s broad-ranging authority under [SOX],” the Court of Appeals observed that “the bulk 
of the Fund’s challenge to [SOX] was fought—and lost—over seventy years ago when the 
Supreme Court decided Humphrey’s Executor.”314 
 Dissenting Court of Appeals Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh’s view of the case and approach 
to the constitutional issues were diametrically opposed to those of the majority.  “This case,” 
Judge Kavanaugh declared, “is Humphrey’s Executor squared.  There is a world of difference 
between the legion of Humphrey’s Executor-style agencies and the PCAOB:  The heads of the 
Humphrey’s Executor independent agencies are removable for cause by the President, whereas 
members of the PCAOB are removable for cause only by another independent agency, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.”  Thus characterizing the PCAOB as a discrete 
“independent executive agency,” presumably separate and apart from and independent of the 
SEC, Judge Kavanaugh focused upon the removal power as a significant tool of control: 
The President’s power to remove is critical to the President’s power to control the 
Executive Branch and perform his Article II responsibilities.  Yet under this 
statute, the President is two levels of for-cause removal away from Board 
members, a previously unheard-of restriction on and attenuation of the President’s 
authority over executive officers.  This structure effectively eliminates any 
Presidential power to control the PCAOB, notwithstanding that the Board 
performs numerous regulatory and law-enforcement functions at the core of the 
executive power. . . . [N]ever before in American history has there been an 
independent agency whose heads are appointed by and removable only for cause 
                                                
314 Id. at 681, 685. 
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by another independent agency, rather than by the President or his alter ego.  But 
that is the case with the PCAOB members, who are removable for cause only by 
the SEC—and it is undisputed that the SEC as an independent agency is not the 
President’s alter ego.  The PCAOB thus goes well beyond what historical practice 
and Humphrey’s Executor authorize.315 
 
 Judge Kavanaugh also attempted to distinguish the PCAOB case from existing Supreme 
Court precedent on the ground that here, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the removal power 
has been effectively and completely stripped from the President.  Moreover, according to 
Kavanaugh, the members of the PCAOB are not inferior officers, but principal officers who must 
be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.316 
Although not addressing the “Heads of Departments” issue directly,317 Judge Kavanaugh 
attempted to rebut the majority’s characterization in discussing the control aspect of the 
Appointments Clause issue, writing: 
None of the . . . authorities [cited by the Board] gives the SEC power to prevent 
and affirmatively command, and to manage the ongoing conduct of, Board 
inspections, investigations, and enforcement actions… After-the-fact judicial or 
quasi-judicial review of enforcement decisions following an investigation does 
                                                
315 Id. at 686-687 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
316 Id. at 687.  Even were PCAOB members construed to be inferior officers, Judge Kavanaugh opined, SOX permits 
the SEC to remove a member from office only when such member has “willfully” broken the law, has “willfully 
abused” his or her authority, or “without reasonable justification or excuse” has “failed to enforce compliance.”  
Such a for-cause standard, according to Kavanaugh, “is more restrictive removal language than the traditional for-
cause language of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”  Id. at 703.  “The statutory language and history [of 
SOX] show, in short,” Kavanaugh asserts, “that the effect and purpose of this statute were to wall off the PCAOB 
from comprehensive SEC control, not to make the PCAOB ‘an arm or an eye’ of the SEC.  The Board’s counter-
factual, counter-textual argument [in the Court of Appeals] ignores the double for-cause reality of this statutory 
scheme.”  Id. at 704 (citation omitted). 
317 Judge Kavanaugh explained that it was unnecessary for him to address the “heads-of-departments” issue because 
he found PCAOB members to be principal, not inferior, officers requiring appointment by the President by and with 
the consent of the Senate, thus rendering the Excepting Clause inapplicable.  Nonetheless, Kavanaugh noted that, on 
that issue, he generally agreed with the majority that 
 
plaintiffs’ submission is inconsistent with current Supreme Court precedents.  On the . . . issue of what 
entities constitute departments, Freytag nominally left open whether the SEC is a department; but as Justice 
Scalia explained in his persuasive concurrence for four Justices, it would not make much sense to hold that 
independent agencies are not departments so long as Humphrey’s Executor is good law.  On the . . . issue of 
who is a head of a department, both text and longstanding Executive Branch interpretation confirm that the 
head of a department can consist of multiple persons. 
 
Id. at 712 n.24 (citations omitted). 
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note remotely equate to direction and supervision for purposes of Edmond . . . . 
[T]he SEC’s exercising, taking over, or limiting the Board’s responsibilities does 
not amount to directing and supervising the PCAOB.318 
 
In his consideration of the plaintiffs’ challenge of the PCAOB provisions of SOX under the 
Appointments Clause, Judge Kavanaugh read Edmond as establishing a two-part test and as 
mandating that an officer who is removable only for cause is ordinarily not  “directed and 
supervised” for purposes of Edmond “at least unless (1) the statute expressly provides that the 
officer can be removed for failing to follow a supervisor’s direction and supervision, or (2) the 
statute expressly provides that a superior officer other than the President has authority to prevent 
and affirmatively command, and to manage the ongoing conduct of, all of the officer's exercises 
of executive authority against the public (such as conducting investigations and taking 
enforcement actions).”  Applying such an analysis to this case, Kavanaugh concluded that 
PCAOB members are principal officers and that because they are not appointed by the President 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the PCAOB provisions of SOX are 
unconstitutional.319 
 Responding to the majority’s observation that the plaintiffs’ separation-of-powers 
challenge was not that Congress or the federal judiciary had impermissibly encroached on the 
President’s appointment, removal, or decision-making authority by aggrandizing their own 
powers but that SOX had impermissibly effected an excessive attenuation of Presidential control 
over the Board, Judge Kavanaugh noted that such a distinction is “not an entirely accurate 
summary of separation of powers principles” and quoted from a decision in 1996 by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy to the effect that “[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself, . . . 
the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of 
                                                
318 PCAOB II, 537 F. 3d at 709-710 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting). 
319 Id. at 709. 
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its constitutional duties.”320  Kavanaugh went on to assert his view that SOX’s restriction on the 
President’s removal power over the PCAOB is unconstitutional under both Humphrey’s 
Executor and Morrison, primarily on the grounds that, unlike the facts in either of those cases, 
“neither the President nor a Presidential alter ego can remove the members of the PCAOB” and 
that, contrary to the dictates of Morrison, this is a case in which the power to remove an 
executive official has been completely stripped from the President, “  ‘thus providing no means 
for the President to ensure the “faithful execution” of the laws.’”321  Concluding that SOX 
impermissibly attenuates the President’s removal power over the PCAOB, Kavanaugh declared: 
Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison represent what up to now have been the 
outermost constitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions on the 
President's removal power.  Therefore, given a choice between drawing the line at 
the holdings in Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison or extending those cases to 
authorize novel structures such as the PCAOB that further attenuate the 
President’s control over executive officers, we should opt for the former.  We 
should resolve questions about the scope of those precedents in light of and in the 
direction of the constitutional text and constitutional history.322 
 
 In a final section of his dissenting opinion, Judge Kavanaugh noted that “from an 
accountability perspective, the whole of this statute is worse than the sum of its parts because 
neither the President nor his alter ego has any role in the appointment of Board members or in 
the removal of Board members.”  Each of these problems, Kavanaugh maintained, compounds 
the other.  Quoting a passage from Professor Laurence H. Tribe, the dissenting court of appeals 
judge emphasized the accountability problem with “this kind of structure”: 
[I]n the particular situation in which an inferior officer is appointed by persons 
who are themselves not politically accountable . . . ongoing supervision by a 
politically accountable official, whether by the President or by someone serving at 
the President’s pleasure, seems particularly important. In such circumstances, 
where there is little or no political accountability at the front end for the choice of 
                                                
320 Id. at 695 n.4. 
321 Id. at 697, 698. 
322 Id. at 698. 
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that officer, a ‘for cause’ limitation on removal that renders political supervision 
impossible appears troubling from an accountability perspective.323 
 
 “Even assuming,” Judge Kavanaugh concluded, “that the statutory scheme structuring the 
PCAOB is an effective means to regulate the accounting industry, ‘that a given law or procedure 
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will 
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.’”324   
C. The Proceedings before the Supreme Court of the United States 
 The Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead Watts filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,325 
which the Supreme Court granted in May 2009.  Several questions were presented to the Court 
and are as follows: 
 1. Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 violates the Constitution's 
separation of powers by vesting members of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board ("PCAOB") with far-reaching executive power while completely 
stripping the President of all authority to appoint or remove those members or 
otherwise supervise or control their exercise of that power, or whether, as the 
court of appeals held, the Act is constitutional because Congress can restrict the 
President's removal authority in any way it "deems best for the public interest."  
  
 2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that, under the Appointments 
Clause, PCAOB members are "inferior officers" directed and supervised by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), where the SEC lacks any 
authority to supervise those members personally, to remove the members for any 
policy- related reason or to influence the members' key investigative functions, 
merely because the SEC may review some of the members' work product.  
       
3. If PCAOB members are inferior officers, whether the Act's provision for 
their appointment by the SEC violates the Appointments Clause either because 
the SEC is not a "Department" under Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991), or because the five commissioners, acting collectively, are not the "Head" 
of the SEC.326 
 
                                                
323 Id. at 713 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-8, at 684 (3d ed.2000). 
324 Id. at 714 (citing INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). 
325 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, No. 08-861 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) (cert. granted 
May 18, 2009); see http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/ docketfiles/08-861.htm (timeline of 
Court filings).  
326 Id. at i.  
 76 
 
A review of the parties’ briefs and the transcript of oral argument before the Supreme Court in 
December 2009 reveals that the parties employ differing interpretations of the applicable 
precedent to resolve these questions.  The lack of clear standards provided by the Court’s prior 
decisions is a factor in the dissimilar arguments set forth by the parties in support of their 
positions in the appeal. 
1. The Appointments Clause Issues 
a. Principal or Inferior Officers? 
The crux of the Free Enterprise Fund case is the claim that SOX violates the 
Appointments Clause, which the Supreme Court has recognized “is among the significant 
structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.”327   
The petitioners have claimed that Board members are principal officers328 and that the 
supervision described in Edmond is absent for Board members.  They argue that Presidential 
removal power is necessary for the “effective discipline” of inferior officers and that, secondly, 
supervision requires “day-to-day oversight.”329  Both are absent here, the petitioners contend.  
Moreover, the petitioners claim: 
in addition to determining whether an officer has a superior, the Court must look 
to the nature of the office and its duties, asking whether the officer enjoys broad 
authority to “formulate policy” in a permanent office with statutory authority, or 
rather is “empowered… to perform only certain, limited duties,” in an office 
“limited in tenure.”330 
 
When viewed by this standard, the petitioners contend, Board members clearly are principal 
officers because they are independent and autonomous, possess policy-making authority, and 
circumvent the usual congressional appropriations process.  Moreover, the petitioners argue, the 
                                                
327 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 651. 
328 Brief for Petitioners at 43. 
329 Id. at 46-47. 
330 Id. at 48 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-672). 
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PCAOB was created by SOX expressly as an independent agency, and, as such, “the heads of all 
agencies or quasi-governmental corporations are appointed by the President with Senate 
confirmation.”331  The Board is its own independent agency, the petitioners argue, so the 
Appointments Clause should apply to the Board’s members as principal officers. 
 Conversely, both respondents rely on Edmond to argue just the opposite:  that Board 
members are inferior officers.332  The Board, for instance, asserts that 
[t]he standard for distinguishing principal from inferior officers is clear.  Under 
Edmond… “[w]hether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a 
superior.” Consequently, “‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed 
and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential 
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”  Here, Board members are 
comprehensively “directed and supervised” by the presidentially appointed 
Commissioners of the SEC.333 
 
This supervision includes, but is not limited to, de novo review by the SEC of any disciplinary 
action taken by the Board, the SEC’s ability to rescind the Board’s authority, and the 
Commission’s rule-approval procedures and informal supervision.334  Having the authority to 
supervise and control is enough, the respondents contend; that the SEC does not actually exercise 
its authority does not mean that the SEC does not have such authority.335  Is, however, the SEC’s 
authority over Board functions the same as at-will removal over Board members?  The court of 
appeals and the respondents answered in the affirmative.336  In response to a question from 
Justice Anthony Kennedy during oral argument before the Court in December 2009, Solicitor 
General Elena Kagan noted that 
the statutory scheme and structure makes it clear that the SEC has comprehensive 
authority not just over the rulemaking, but over the investigative and inspection 
                                                
331 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 328, at 50. 
332 See Brief for PCAOB at 15; Brief for United States, at 29-30. 
333 Brief for PCAOB at 15 (citing Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662-663) (citation omitted). 
334 See PCAOB Rule 5206; Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 106 (d)(1), 107 (b); Brief for United States at 27. 
335 See Brief for PCAOB at 24 (“oversight powers… enable control by their existence, not just their exercise”). 
336 PCAOB II at 30; Brief for United States at 28. 
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activities of the board; that no – no sanction arising from an investigation can be 
issued except if the board agrees; that no inspection report can be issued, except if 
the . . . the SEC agrees. 
 
And further, as I said before, that the SEC can reach further back into the process 
and say, not only do we have this kind of veto authority over any sanction that 
comes out of an investigation or over any report that comes out of an inspection, 
but we can also change the way those inspections and investigations are 
conducted in the first place.337 
 
Also, during oral argument, counsel for the petitioners attempted to minimize the SEC’s 
statutory authority to rescind the Board’s authority to investigate and inspect and to distinguish 
between the SEC’s authority to restrict before-the-fact action by the Board and the 
Commission’s authority to review and rescind proposed Board action after-the-fact.  “If I relieve 
my associate of the responsibility to give me a brief tomorrow, I haven’t told him he can’t do it,” 
counsel argued.  “Don’t . . . you think that’s what it means, though, realistically?” Justice Scalia 
responded, “When you no longer have responsibility to perform a . . . governmental act, you no 
longer have the authority to perform it.”338 
 Following this exchange, Justice Kennedy asked counsel for the petitioners, “What other 
harms or dangers or risks are inherent in the power of the Board unmonitored, unchecked by the 
SEC, to investigate?”  Counsel responded, “The burden here is the burden that Mr. Olson 
suffered in Morrison v. Olson.  He was never indicted.  There was [sic] never any sanctions 
subject to review.  But he was subject to a burdensome investigation and that is the burden that 
affects American citizens that is beyond the review of the SEC.”339  
Additionally, the PCAOB challenges the petitioners’ assertion that prohibiting for-cause 
removal of Board members makes them de facto principal officers.  Perkins held that the 
removal of inferior officers could indeed be limited, and the respondents highlighted that 
                                                
337 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-37. 
338 Id. at 8. 
339 Id. at 12. 
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Edmond had intimated that removal is not the only method of supervision:  “while ‘[t]he power 
to remove officers * * * is a powerful tool for control,’ it is not the only such tool.”340 
 b. Is the SEC a Department? 
Even if the Board members are found to be inferior officers, does SOX still violate the 
Appointments Clause because the SEC is not a “Department” or because the SEC’s 
commissioners are not, collectively, the “Head” of a department?  The SEC is not directly 
accountable to the President, petitioners allege, because the President does not have the authority 
to remove the SEC’s commissioners at will and because the commissioners together do not 
constitute a department’s “Head.”341   
The United States countered:  
Treating the Commissioners as the SEC’s “Head” therefore is much more natural 
than saying that the SEC has no “Head,” or that its “Head” is a person in whom 
Congress has not vested the agency’s final decision-making authority.  See Silver 
v. Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Postal 
Service is a “Department” under the Appointments Clause, and its nine Governors 
collectively constitute the “Head” for appointment purposes); Authority of Civil 
Serv. Comm’n to Appoint a Chief Examiner, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 231 (1933) 
(opining that the three commissioners of the Civil Service Commission 
collectively served as “the ‘head of a Department’ in the constitutional sense”); 
cf. Classification Act of 1923, ch. 265, § 2, 42 Stat. 1488 (“ ‘the head of the 
department’ means the officer or group of officers in the department who are not 
subordinate or responsible to any other officer of the department”) (emphasis 
added).342  
 
Moreover, the government noted, the Court has long construed the Appointments Clause to 
permit a person other than the agency head (here, for the sake of argument, the SEC’s 
commissioners) to appoint an inferior officer so long as the appointment is made with the 
approval or approbation of the agency head (presumably, again for the sake of argument, in those 
cases when the chairman, who is also an SEC commissioner, votes with a majority of the 
                                                
340 See Brief for PCAOB at 22 (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664) (emphasis in original brief). 
341 Brief for Petitioners at 56. 
342 Brief for United States at 40. 
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commissioners to appoint a particular Board member).343  While petitioners used the 
Reorganization Act of 1949344 to show that the chairman exercised significant authority, the 
Commission, collectively, the government noted, was given control over Board appointments 
under SOX, which is consistent with other existing rulemaking and enforcement authority of the 
SEC.345 
The petitioners interpret Freytag to mean that appointments under the Excepting Clause 
must go to those “directly answerable” to the President, so that any holding otherwise by the 
Court would overrule that precedent.346  The independent agencies are “part of the Executive 
Branch,” the respondents counter.347  Moreover, emphasized the respondent, the Chairman is 
accountable to the President, though the petitioners are not satisfied with that.  Finally, the 
petitioners charge that if the Chairman were not the “Head” of the SEC, then all inferior officer 
appointments within the SEC made by the Chairman alone rather than by the whole Commission 
(limited, in fact, to certain staff members) would be unconstitutional,348 to which the respondents 
reply, “But those staff members are not appointed ‘by the Chairman alone.’ . . . ‘[T]he 
appointment[s] by the Chairman of the heads of major administrative units under the 
Commission [are] subject to the approval of the Commission.”349  During oral argument, this 
exchange between counsel for the petitioners and Justice Scalia, captured that idea:   
MR. CARVIN:  [I]f you accept their view of who the head of the department is, 
                                                
343 Id. at 41. 
344 Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, § 1 (a), 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (May 25, 1950) (delegating to the SEC chairman 
executive and administrative functions). 
345 Brief for PCAOB at 33. 
346 Brief for Petitioners at 59. 
347 Brief for PCAOB at 30 (citing Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 773 (2002) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.) (although independent agencies are “sometimes 
referred to pejoratively as part of a ‘headless Fourth Branch,’ . . . agencies, even “independent agencies,” are more 
appropriately considered to be part of the Executive Branch”). 
348 Brief for Petitioners at 62. 
349 Brief for PCAOB at 35 (citing Reorganization Plan No. 10, § 1 (b)(2), 15 Fed. Reg. 3175) (emphasis in original 
brief). 
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which is the commission -- 
 
JUSTICE SCALIA:  All those appointments are presumably invalid. 
 
MR. CARVIN:  -- all those appointments are unconstitutional, so under their 
theory -- 
 
JUSTICE SCALIA:  That would be a shame.350 
 
2. The Separation of Powers Issues  
The principle of “separation of powers… is at the heart of our Constitution.”351  The 
Constitution vests power in three separate branches of government and allocates power among 
the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary.352  The power of the Executive over the 
PCAOB is one of the principal issues at hand in the Free Enterprise Fund case.   
The petitioners allege that the power of the Executive has been encroached upon by 
Congress with the creation of the PCAOB.353  The creation of the Board, however, was a 
congressional response to increasing demand from the public for reform, especially during the 
post-Enron, post-WorldCom period.  Moreover, the Center for Audit Quality (the “CAQ”), as 
amicus curiae, has urged the Court to consider the purpose that Congress attempted to serve 
when it created the PCAOB.  Even comments by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg during oral 
argument in the case allude to the need for the Board.  Indeed, during the rebuttal by counsel for 
the petitioners, Justice Ginsburg commented that “[t]here is a problem that Congress had to 
solve.  It wanted to tighten the oversight of the auditing function.”354  The amicus brief355 
elaborates this perspective for the Court.  Instead of supporting the respondent’s constitutional 
                                                
350 Transcript of Oral Argument at 26. 
351 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 119; see M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERs (2d ed., 
Liberty Fund 1998) (1967). 
352 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (one-house legislative veto violated separation of powers). 
353 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727 (“dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long 
been recognized”). 
354 Transcript of Oral Argument at 65. 
355 Brief for the Center for Audit Quality as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, PCAOB III, No. 08-861 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009). 
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arguments, the CAQ emphasizes the PCAOB’s role in the markets as a compelling reason for 
upholding the legitimacy of the PCAOB.  The CAQ notes that 
PCAOB inspections have improved audit quality in a number of ways. . . . . 
Moreover, the PCAOB’s oversight of the profession brings with it stability and 
predictability that is beneficial to both the investing public and the audit 
profession. The profession appreciates the benefits that a tough but fair, well-
informed and appropriately focused regulator can bring to audit quality, and 
recognizes that an entity charged with audit regulation provides corresponding 
benefits to investors.356 
 
By enacting SOX, petitioners claim, Congress has completely “circumvent[ed]… basic 
controls on governmental power…by, for the first time in our Nation’s history, vesting this 
potentially tyrannical authority in a purportedly private ‘corporation’ whose members are not 
‘officer[s]… or agent[s of] the Federal Government.’”357  Moreover, they argue that the statute 
impedes the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty to carry out the laws of the 
United States.358  The petitioners contend that “this is quite a simple case because (i) the 
President has no ability to control or supervise Board members, (ii) Congress has at least 
equivalent ability to influence the Board, and (iii) there is no legitimate justification, let alone an 
‘overriding need,’ for this intrusion.”359  By this, the petitioners mean that the President has no 
“at-will” removal authority, no authority via an “alter ego,” and no direct or indirect influence 
over Board action.360  Congress, they argue, even impermissibly retains control over the removal 
of Board members since it has, in effect, an ultimate “veto power over any Board member’s 
                                                
356 Id. at 4. 
357 Brief for Petitioners at 9, PCAOB III, No. 08-861 (U.S. July 27, 2009) (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101 (a) and 
(b)) (emphasis in original). 
358 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed”); Loving v. United States, 517 
U.S.  748 at 757 (1996) (“[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself,… the separation of powers 
doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of it constitutional duties”). 
359 Brief for Petitioners at 25, PCAOB III, No. 08-861 (citing Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).   
360 Id. at 25-30. 
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removal” in the form of denying confirmation of new SEC Commissioners who might be 
nominated by the President for the purpose of firing Board members:361   
Upholding the Board here would therefore plainly authorize Congress to reduce 
the President to the largely symbolic and hortatory role of appointing bipartisan 
independent commissioners who, in turn, would appoint independent board 
members who do the actual governing but could not be removed or supervised by 
the President in any circumstance, and where any indirect removal effort would 
necessarily involve the Senate’s participation. This arrangement cannot 
reasonably be squared with the Constitution’s plain language and is precisely the 
unaccountable plural executive that the Framers expressly rejected because it 
would both place the executive under the thumb of Congress and place citizens 
under the thumb of unelected functionaries. If the Constitution’s express vesting 
of the “executive power” in the President, and the Court’s consistent endorsement 
of the Constitution’s liberty-enhancing separated powers, are anything more than 
meaningless rhetoric, the Act’s complete separation of the executive power from 
the Executive must be patently unconstitutional.362 
 
The government, in response, relies on Humphrey’s Executor as having established the 
constitutional sufficiency of the President’s control over independent agencies as settled law for 
more than seventy years.363  Moreover, respondent United States argues, the Court has long 
recognized since well before Perkins that Congress clearly has the authority to restrict the 
President’s power to remove inferior officers when the power to appoint such officers is vested 
in the head of a department or in the courts of law under the Excepting Clause.364  Hence, the 
Appointments Clause actually contemplates the attenuation of Presidential power to control and 
supervise (and ultimately, Presidential accountability) because “the power of removal is incident 
to the power of appointment.”365 
                                                
361 Id. at 31 (“this case is actually worse than Myers because the Senate’s acquiescence in confirming the 
replacement Commissioners would not result in the removal of the Board member the President wants to fire—it 
would only be the first, speculative step toward such removal) (Id. at footnote 4). 
362 Id. at 38. 
363 Brief for the United States at 42, PCAOB III, No. 08-861 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009). 
364 Id. at 34, 44; see Perkins, 116 U.S. at 485; Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 260 (“the power of removal is incident to 
the power of appointment”).  See also Myers, 272 U.S. at 161-162 (“Congress, in committing the appointment of 
such inferior officers to the heads of departments, may prescribe incidental regulations controlling and restricting the 
latter in the exercise of the power of removal”). 
365 Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 260. 
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The United States further notes that petitioners do not dispute the constitutionality either 
of independent agencies, which has been well established since Humphrey’s Executor,366 or of 
the SEC, which apparently has never seriously been questioned since the Supreme Court 
declined to address the constitutionality of the Securities Act of 1933 in 1936.367  Additionally, 
respondent PCAOB argues that Congress, in fact, has less control than suggested by the 
petitioners because SOX actually places the PCAOB outside the congressional budget and 
appropriation process.368   
The issue of removal is vital to the discussion of the separation-of-powers argument.  The 
Petitioners allege that SOX violates the Morrison two-part test, which, according to the 
petitioners, is “whether the restriction on Presidential removal ‘by itself’ impermissibly prevents 
his ‘control [and] supervision’ and, if not, whether the Act, ‘taken as a whole,’ does.369  SOX 
prevents “at-will” removal of Board members; instead, the SEC can only remove Board 
                                                
366 Brief for the United States at 42-43.  Although some of the petitioners’ amici argue in their briefs filed with the 
Supreme Court in this case that Humphrey’s Executor should be overruled or that the 1935 decision has been 
superseded by Morrison, which itself, they contend, should be overruled, the United States notes that petitioners 
themselves do not ask the Court to overrule Humphrey’s Executor and emphasize why such an action by the Court 
would be extremely disruptive.  “In the seven decades since [Humphrey’s Executor],” the United States observes, “ 
‘independent’ agencies have become an accepted part of American government.”  Id. at 43 n.16. 
367 See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).  The Jones case arose from a ruling by the SEC refusing to permit J. 
Edward Jones, the nation’s largest dealer in oil royalty securities, to withdraw a registration statement that the 
agency considered to be seriously misleading.  When the SEC filed an application in a federal district court for an 
order requiring Jones to appear and give evidence in the matter of Jones’s registration statement, he challenged the 
constitutionality of both the 1933 Act and the SEC’s rule preventing the withdrawal of his registration statement.  
The district court issued the order, and Jones appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed, ruling in favor of the SEC on 
all of the issues raised by Jones, and, among other things, upheld the constitutionality of the 1933 Act (and 
presumably the constitutionality of the SEC as well).  When the case reached the Supreme Court in March 1936, the 
Court reversed on the ground that the SEC should have followed controlling equity rules and permitted the 
withdrawal.  At the conclusion of Justice George Sutherland’s decision for the Court in Jones, the Court noted that, 
in the light of the reversal of the decision by the court of appeals on that ground, it was “unnecessary to consider the 
constitutional validity of the act.”  Id. at 28.  At least one noted historian of the SEC has concluded that by not 
reaching and reversing that portion of the court of appeals’ decision that upheld the constitutionality of the 1933 Act 
(and presumably the constitutionality of the SEC), the Court in effect had allowed the ruling by the court of appeals 
on that issue “to stand as controlling law.”  SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET, supra note 4, at 150-
151.  There do not appear to be any subsequent federal decisions that address any challenges to the constitutionality 
of the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act, or the SEC. 
368 Brief for the PCAOB, et al. at 52, PCAOB III, No. 08-861 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 109 
(b)-(d) (budget subject to SEC approval; funded from registration fees and accounting support fees). 
369 Brief for Petitioners, at 38-39, PCAOB III, No. 08-861 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685, 695).    
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members “for cause.”370  This limitation is, petitioners argue, too restrictive and impermissibly 
limits the President’s control.  This limitation is further complicated because there are two levels 
of for-cause removal, which according to the petitioners effectively removes the President from 
exercising control over the Board.  Indeed, as Judge Kavanaugh wrote in his dissent: 
But this case is Humphrey’s Executor squared. . . . [U]nder this statute, the 
President is two levels of for-cause removal away from Board members, a 
previously unheard-of restriction on and attenuation of the President’s authority 
over executive officers. This structure effectively eliminates any Presidential 
power to control the PCAOB.371 
 
According to the government, however, “the Court observed in Morrison . . . with respect 
to an inferior officer, ‘we cannot say that the imposition of a ‘good cause’ standard for removal 
by itself unduly trammels on executive authority.”372  In addition to violating the “two-part test,” 
the petitioners further argue that, of course, in Morrison there was a need to have restrictions on 
the President’s removal power, since the independent counsel was investigating alleged 
wrongdoing within the Executive Branch.  That is, they argue, not the situation in the case at 
hand.373  Interestingly, the PCAOB argues that the President’s overall control in the traditional 
sense of chain-of-command authority, and not removal alone, should be the focus of the Court’s 
inquiry and that, in the light of SOX’s grant to the SEC of “multiple powers that are equivalent 
to at-will removal authority,” SOX “does not unconstitutionally restrict the President’s 
traditional chain-of-command authority” because the SEC controls “each and every exercise of 
the Board’s authority” and “SOX does not diminish the President’s authority over the SEC in the 
slightest.”374  Moreover, the PCAOB argues, the “removal-follows-appointment rationale does 
not depend on whether the department head is removable for cause or at will.  The department 
                                                
370 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 107 (d)(3). 
371 PCAOB II, 537 F. 3d at 686 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
372 Brief for United States, at 45 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691) (citation omitted). 
373 Brief for Petitioners at 42-43. 
374 Brief for PCAOB at 45, PCAOB III, No. 08-861 (U.S Oct. 13, 2009). 
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head must be sufficiently accountable to the President that the department is, in fact, a 
‘department’ capable of appointing inferior officers. . . . But neither the Constitution nor 
precedent supports a further requirement that the department head be removable at will.”375 
Wholly apart from the legal issues here is Justice Scalia’s well-known hostility towards 
Humphrey’s Executor,376 as evidenced by this exchange at oral argument: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . Humphrey's Executor says you can limit the 
President's removal power. That doesn't get you down to the board. You have to 
also say the principal officers, there can be limits on their removal authority of the 
board members. 
 
GENERAL KAGAN: I -- I understand the temptation to say something like, well, 
we don't really much like Humphrey's Executor, but we are stuck with it, but not 
an inch further. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I didn't say anything bad about Humphrey's 
Executor. 
 
(Laughter.)  
 
GENERAL KAGAN:  But -- but --  
 
JUSTICE SCALIA:  I did, I did.  
 
(Laughter.)  
 
GENERAL KAGAN:  But this in fact --  
 
JUSTICE SCALIA:  We did overrule it, by the way, in -- in Morrison, didn't we?377 
 
V. Analysis of the Free Enterprise Fund Case 
As of the date of the submission of this paper in early May 2010, the Supreme Court has 
not issued a decision in the Free Enterprise Fund case, and there is no realistic way of predicting 
what result the Court might reach when its decision is announced. 
                                                
375 Id. at 42 (building on Hennen’s removal-follows-appointment principle). 
376 STAAB, supra note 205, at 62-63. 
377 Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-43. 
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It is possible, however, to anticipate the possible analytical approaches that the Court 
might employ.  This section addresses those approaches and, when appropriate, suggests which 
of those approaches the Court is likely to take.378 
There are several questions to be answered by the Court.  Precedent has laid the 
foundation for principal/inferior officer status and the definition of a “Department,” but the 
parties have interpreted the cases quite differently.  Ultimately, it is up to the Court to decide the 
issues and determine the constitutionality of the PCAOB. 
It seems evident that the SEC does not have the resources or interest to promulgate 
auditing standards.  Indeed, the SEC has historically vested the setting of accounting standards in 
the private sector (i.e., FASB, AICPA).379  Now, subsequent to the scandals at Enron and other 
firms, the government has increased authority over the audit function.  Therefore, accountability 
has been increased since this oversight was removed from the private sector.  The 
constitutionality of this transfer, however, is at stake in the Free Enterprise Fund case.   
It should be kept in mind that this is a facial challenge brought by the petitioners.  Facial 
constitutional challenges are not favored by the courts, and the petitioners should have to satisfy 
a substantial burden of persuasion in order to prevail in the Supreme Court.380 
 
                                                
378 This analysis is based on existing Court precedent.  It should be noted, however, that an alternative checks-and-
balances approach has been suggested that asks not whether congressional efforts to insulate agency independence 
from Presidential control impermissibly infringe on the President’s appointment and removal power from the 
perspective of a particular facet of separation-of-powers theory, but whether there are sufficient checks and balances 
on the actions of the agency in question relative to all three branches of government.  Brown, supra note 243, at 146.  
Such a checks-and-balances approach would, according to its proponent, safeguard “an important structural interest 
protected by the Appointments Clause:  accountability.”  Id. at 153.  Such “structural interests [sic] may be satisfied 
by a variety or combination of [ten] oversight tools grounded in the three-branch system.”  Id.  Although the 
proposed checks-and-balances approach might have some appeal as a theoretical matter, it is difficult to envision 
how such an approach might be incorporated into and applied as a viable judicial test.  As a result, it seems unlikely 
that the current Court will embrace and apply such an approach in the Free Enterprise Fund case as an alternative to 
the well-established standards under the Court’s existing legal precedent. 
379 Brief for Amici Curiae Former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of Respondents 
at 7, PCAOB III, No. 08-861 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009). 
380 For a discussion of the burden-of-persuasion issue, see Part III.E, supra. 
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A. Appointments Clause Issues 
1. Principal/Inferior Officers Question 
Foremost, the Court will need to resolve the issue of the principal/inferior officer status 
of Board members.381  Will the Court establish a definition for officer status?  Most likely not, 
but the Court ultimately should use Edmond or Morrison to decide this Appointments Clause 
issue.   
Board members are subject to removal by a higher Executive authority (i.e., the SEC), 
and, arguably, the PCAOB has limited jurisdiction (i.e., the auditing of public companies).  
Furthermore, Board members are term-limited.382  Hence, applying three of the Morrison 
criteria, the Court should conclude that PCAOB members are inferior officers.  The Court might 
very well conclude, however, that the final criterion of Morrison—whether the officers have 
limited duties—is not present because the Board performs a policy-making function and has both 
investigatory and enforcement authority.  Are the functions of the PCAOB quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial in the same sense that the Court in Humphrey’s Executor concluded that the FTC 
performed?  While Justice Scalia might like the opportunity presented by the Free Enterprise 
Fund case to overturn Humphrey’s Executor,383 the assumption is that he will be unable to 
persuade four other members of the Court to join him in doing so384 and that the Court’s decision 
in the earlier case will continue to serve as applicable precedent in this case.  If so, then the 
PCAOB facts provide support for answering this question in the affirmative.  The WCC 
                                                
381 Board members are clearly not employees, and neither the petitioners nor the respondents argue otherwise. 
382 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105 (e) (5). 
383 See note 235, infra, and accompany text. 
384 The consensus among constitutional scholars is that “Humphrey’s Executor is considered the seminal case that 
legitimated independent agencies as a constitutional matter” and that “the Supreme Court has signaled a reluctance 
to disturb the well-entrenched legality of independent agencies since Humphrey’s Executor.” Brown, supra note 
243, at 122; Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish 
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 490 (1987).  Indeed, the Court “has consistently endorsed the 
constitutionality of independence from the President.”  Brown, supra note 243, at145. 
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members in Wiener, for instance, were deemed to be inferior officers who performed not purely 
executive functions, but quasi-judicial functions, and they did not even answer to a higher review 
or supervisory authority.  Conversely, PCAOB members are subject to comprehensive oversight 
and review by the SEC and, hence, the likelihood that Board members will be characterized as 
inferior officers is even stronger than was the case with respect to the WCC members in Wiener. 
Finally, are Board members sufficiently supervised and controlled to satisfy Edmond?  In 
Edmond, of course, the Judge Advocate General was authorized to remove a CGCCA judge from 
his judicial assignment at will, or without cause,385 and the Judge Advocate General presumably 
was removable without cause by the Secretary of Transportation, who himself was removable by 
the President without cause whereas in the Free Enterprise Fund case, the SEC only has the 
authority to remove PCAOB members and only for cause.  Is that distinction significant for 
purposes of the Appointments Clause?  The Court in Edmond seems to have indicated that it was 
not.  For although the Judge Advocate General was authorized to remove a CGCCA judge from 
his or her judicial assignment, the Court noted that the Judge Advocate General’s control over 
the CGCCA was “not complete” and that the power to reverse decisions of the CGCCA was 
vested in another Executive Branch entity, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.386  The 
removal power, however, was not in itself determinative of the question of whether CGCCA 
judges were inferior or principal officers.  “What is significant,” the Edmond Court emphasized, 
“is that the judges of the [CGCCA] have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the 
United States unless permitted to do so by other executive officers.”387  Moreover, in holding 
                                                
385 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664.  It is not clear from the Court’s decision whether the removal of a CGCCA judge from 
his assignment was the equivalent of the removal of the judge from his or her office.  One of the holdings of the 
Edmond Court was that it was the Secretary of Transportation, and not the Judge Advocate General, who had the 
authority to appoint the judges of the CGCCA, rather than merely assign such judges to a Court of Criminal 
Appeals.  Id. at 658. 
386 Id. at 664. 
387 Id. at 665. 
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some six decades earlier that the FTC Act’s provision that “any commissioner may be removed 
by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office” permissibly limits the 
President’s authority to remove FTC commissioners to these causes only, i.e., for cause, the 
Court in Humphrey’s Executor specifically sanctioned the restriction to “for cause” of the 
President’s power to remove the member of an independent agency for separation-of-powers 
purposes.388   
Moreover, the Court in Morrison observed that, with respect to an inferior officer, “we 
cannot say that the imposition of ‘good cause’ standard for removal by itself unduly trammels on 
executive authority.”389 
Relying upon Edmond, the PCAOB in the Free Enterprise Fund case argues that the 
determination of the issue of whether Board members are inferior or principal officers does not 
turn on removal alone and that, in any event, the SEC’s comprehensive control over the PCAOB 
constitutes the “equivalent” of at-will removal power.390  Although there does not appear to be 
any legal precedent for the latter proposition, the former argument seems to be the better view.  
Just as with the judges of the CGCCA, whom the Court in Edmond concluded were inferior 
officers, there is with respect to the PCAOB a superior Executive Branch entity—the SEC—that 
is similar to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (and ultimately the Supreme Court) with 
respect to the CGCCA and that supervises the work of the PCAOB, with power to determine its 
procedural rules, to remove any member of the PCAOB for cause, and to order any adjudicative 
                                                
388 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 626. 
389 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (citation omitted). 
390 Brief for PCAOB at 45. 
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decision by the Board submitted for review.391  As the Court of Appeals in Free Enterprise Fund 
concluded, 
[SOX] subjects Board members to greater supervision than the Coast Guard 
judges in Edmond, whom the Supreme Court held to be inferior officers even 
though supervision of the judges was fractured between two different bodies, and 
their decisions were not subject to de novo review.  Contrary to the Fund’s 
suggestion, the fact that the Board is charged with exercising extensive authority 
on behalf of the United States does not mean that Board members must be 
appointed by the President, for principal as well as inferior officers, by definition, 
‘exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.’”  
Indeed, what is key under the Edmond analysis is the fact that Board members 
“have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless 
permitted to do so by other Executive officers.  [SOX] vests a broad range of 
duties in the Board, but its exercise of those duties is subject to check by the 
Commission at every significant step.392 
 
Hence, wholly apart from the PCAOB’s “equivalency” argument, the Court in the Free 
Enterprise Fund case should conclude that the members of the PCAOB are inferior, 
rather than principal, officers. 
2. Department Question 
 In deciding Freytag, the Court did not provide a definition for what constitutes a 
Department for purposes of the Appointments Clause.  Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in 
Freytag indicated “that the term ‘Departments’ means all independent executive establishments . 
. .[, and] there is no reason, in text, judicial decision, history, or policy, to limit the phrase “the 
Heads of Departments” in the Appointments Clause to those officials who are members of the 
                                                
391 See Edmond v. United States , 520 U.S. at 665-666.  All PCAOB adjudications are subject to the SEC’s de novo 
review.  15 U.S.C. § 7217(c)(2); National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 804 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005).  In addition, the SEC is empowered by SOX to “modify, cancel, reduce, or require the remission of a 
sanction imposed by the Board” and to “relieve the Board of its enforcement authority altogether.”  15 U.S.C. § 
7217(d)(1); PCAOB II, 537 F.3d at 670, 672.  The SEC also is authorized to “abrogate, add to, and delete from” the 
rules adopted by the Board and to conform the Board’s rules to the requirements of Title I of SOX and to the 
purposes of SOX.  15 U.S.C. §§ 7217(b)(5), 78s(c).  Indeed, the SEC’s authority and control over the PCAOB is 
both “explicit and comprehensive.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 7217, 7218; PCAOB II, 537 F.3d at 670, 669. 
392 PCAOB II, 537 F.3d at 672 (citations omitted). 
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President’s Cabinet.”393  Yet, during oral argument, Justice Scalia commented to counsel to the 
petitioners that, “I hope your case doesn’t rest on Freytag.”394 
If it is determined that the SEC is a department, the Court must also consider whether, 
acting together as one, the commissioners of the SEC are the “Head” of the department.  Silver is 
judicial precedent supporting this concept.  Moreover, the fact that all but the most basic of 
administrative functions are subject to Commission approval is solid support for holding that the 
Commission, collectively, is the “Head.” 
B. Separation-of-Powers Issues 
In her opinion in the Court of Appeals decision, Judge Rogers described the “crux” of the 
Free Enterprise Fund case as the double for-cause limitation on the President’s removal power, 
which “makes it impossible for the President to perform his [constitutional] duties.”395  During 
oral argument before the Court, the following exchange occurred between Solicitor General 
Kagan and Chief Justice Roberts:  
GENERAL KAGAN:  The ultimate constitutional question is the level of 
presidential control, and the presidential control here is exactly the same with 
respect to the board's activities as it is with respect to the SEC staff's activities. 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  Oh, no, no, because you have got an extra layer 
there. Let's say, I mean, that you have to have two violations of the for-cause 
provision. You have got to have -- you have to meet the requirement in two 
places. When the SEC wants to remove the board member, they can only do that 
for cause. And if they decide, well, there isn't cause; I'm not going to do it, then 
the President under your theory has to remove the SEC commissioners, all of 
them, not just -- not just the chairman, and he can only do that for cause. 
 
So you have got “for cause” squared, and that's -- that's a significant 
limitation that Humphrey's Executor didn't recognize and Morrison didn't 
recognize.396 
 
                                                
393  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918, 920 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
394 Transcript of Oral Argument at 23. 
395 PCAOB II, 537 F. 3d at 679. 
396 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-45. 
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The issue presented by the double for-cause limitation on the President’s removal power 
is, as Judge Rogers noted in her opinion for the Court of Appeals, one of “first 
impression”397 in that the Supreme Court has to date not been faced a restriction on 
removal that passes through two levels of control.  Because of these two levels of control, 
neither Morrison nor Edmond is directly applicable.  In both Morrison and Edmond, there 
was “flow-through” Executive control in the form of removal power.    In Morrison, the 
independent counsel was removable by Attorney General, a cabinet-level officer, who 
was removable at will by the President.  Similarly, in Edmond, the Secretary of 
Transportation, also a cabinet-level officer, was removable at will by the President, and 
the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces are removable by 
the President for cause.398  In both Morrison and Edmond, a cabinet-level officer who 
was removable at will by the President exercised either oversight or removal control.  
That is what makes the Free Enterprise Fund case different from both Morrison and 
Edmond—in the Free Enterprise Fund case, only the SEC, whose commissioners are 
removable by the President only for cause, stands between the President and the Board 
(i.e., there is no “flow through” control by the President over the Board).  The question 
that is presented here is whether the absence of “flow-through” control is sufficient for 
separation-of-powers purposes.  The parties’ differing characterizations of Morrison and 
Edmond probably arise because this case is not conclusively governed by either of those 
cases.   
 If one juxtaposes the holding in Humphrey’s Executor, which found for-cause 
removal control to be sufficient for independent agencies, with the preceding analysis, the 
                                                
397 PCAOB II, 537 F. 3d at 679. 
398 The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is deemed be located within the Executive Branch.  See 
Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665 n.2.  For the President’s removal authority, see 10 U.S.C. § 942 (c). 
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absence of “flow-through” control might well be found to constitute sufficient 
Presidential control over the Board. 
C. Accountability Issue 
Justice Stevens’s observation in Chevron that administrative “agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is” 399 constitutes, as had been noted merely a 
statement of political reality, not a constitutional principle.  Even assuming, however, that Justice 
Stevens’s statement does, indeed, amount to a statement of binding constitutional principle and 
that, by application of that principle to inferior officers appointed under the Excepting Clause of 
the Appointments Clause, the accountability doctrine does, indeed, apply to such officers serving 
within independent agencies, then the issues in each such case would be, first, whether such 
officer is appointed by persons who are indeed, in Professor Tribe’s words, “themselves not 
politically accountable” and, second, if so, whether there is “ongoing supervision” of such 
official “by a politically accountable official.”400 
 Here, given the President’s ability to remove SEC commissioners (including the 
chairman) for cause, which appears to have been sanctioned by both Humphrey’s Executor and 
Morrison, the answer to Processor Tribe’s first question seems to be that the PCAOB members 
are appointed and removable by persons—the SEC commissioners—who are politically 
accountable to the President.  Moreover, in the light of the comprehensive non-removal controls 
over the PCAOB exercised by the SEC, the answer to Tribe’s second question seems to be that 
there is, indeed, ongoing supervision of Board members by politically accountable officials.  
Hence, the Court should resolve any political accountability issues in favor of the PCAOB. 
 
                                                
399 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851, 865-866 (1984) (citation 
omitted).  
400 See TRIBE, supra note 247, at 684. 
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D. Severability Issue 
 
 Commentators have suggested that if the PCAOB is declared unconstitutional, then the 
remainder of SOX will be invalidated because of the absence of a severability provision in the 
statute.  As the Supreme Court has noted, however, 
The unconstitutionality of a part of an act does not necessarily defeat or affect the 
validity of its remaining provisions.  Unless it is evident that the Legislature 
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, 
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left 
is fully operative as a law . . . [The] invalidity of any part of the act shall not in 
any manner affect the remaining portions.  That discloses an intention to make the 
act divisible, and creates a presumption that, eliminating invalid parts, the 
Legislature would have been satisfied with what remained, and that the scheme of 
regulation derivable from the other provisions would have been enacted without 
regard to [the invalid power].401 
 
Hence, even the absence of a severability provision in SOX would not necessarily result in the 
invalidation of the entire statute were the Court to rule that the statute’s PCAOB provisions are 
unconstitutional.  Under the long-recognized judicially created severability doctrine (the 
“Severability Doctrine”), that would be the result only if the Court determines that Congress 
would not have enacted the remaining portions of SOX without the PCAOB provisions. 
 The application of the Severability Doctrine by the Court in the Free Enterprise Fund 
case, however, would not necessarily mean that the remaining provisions of SOX would survive 
if the PCAOB provisions fail.  The Court might well find that Congress would not have enacted 
the remaining provisions of SOX independently of the PCAOB provisions.  It is true that SOX 
includes numerous provisions that are designed to protect investors and that are not dependent on 
the PCAOB, e.g., the provisions requiring the certification of financial statements by CEOs and 
CFOs that no material misstatement exists (§ 302); the requirement of an assessment by 
management on internal controls as well as a report on that assessment by the independent 
                                                
401 Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932) (citation omitted).  Accord, 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108-109 (1976). 
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auditor (§ 404); requiring disclosure on a financial expert on the audit committee (§ 407); and the 
protection of whistleblowers (§ 806).  Many of the requirements outside of the PCAOB 
provisions in SOX are independent of the PCAOB and are enforceable by the SEC and, 
moreover, would remain fully functional and operational without the PCAOB.  As the CAQ 
noted in the amicus brief that it filed in this case: 
[SOX] has many provisions focused on enhancing the accuracy and reliability of 
financial statements, including a requirement for management certifications 
relating to financial statements, new disclosures and audit procedures related to 
internal controls, and an enhanced role for audit committees.402 
 
The CAQ concedes, however, that “[t]he centerpiece of the legislation is the creation of 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board” and that the passage of SOX “created 
a new paradigm for audit regulation, which relies heavily on the newly created 
PCAOB.”403 
 On the other hand, the invalidation of SOX—which has been viewed by the 
public as a major piece of investor protection legislation—in its entirety could have a 
potentially significant detrimental effect on investor confidence and on enforcement of 
the federal securities laws, and the Court conceivably could consider that potential impact 
in its assessment of whether Congress would have enacted SOX as an investor-protection 
measure even without the PCAOB provisions. 
VI. Implications of the Court’s Decision 
 The Court’s decision in the Free Enterprise Fund case will result in one of two scenarios.  
In the first, the constitutionality of the PCAOB is upheld.  In the second, the Court would deem 
the PCAOB to be unconstitutional.  Several public policy questions and governance implications 
arise from the second scenario.   
                                                
402 Brief for CAQ, supra note 355, at 2-3. 
403 Id. at 3. 
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A. Scenario 1:  Constitutionality of PCAOB Upheld 
 Should the Court affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the constitutionality of the 
PCAOB will have been validated.  The PCAOB, having passed constitutional muster, would 
continue as the regulatory authority for auditors.  As the CAQ observed in its amicus brief: 
. . . [T]he establishment of the PCAOB has generally been seen by auditors as a 
net positive for the profession, capital markets, and investors. Were the Court to 
strike down the PCAOB, all of these benefits—expert, focused regulation; 
improved audit quality through a system of inspections emphasizing remediation; 
and stability of the regulatory regime—would be cast aside.404 
 
Furthermore, the negative effects that the Free Enterprise Fund case has had on the on-
going ability of the organization to recruit Board members will be remediated.405  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to improve investor confidence and the public 
responsibility of independent auditors that Chief Justice Burger described in U.S. v. 
Arthur Young & Co., and both objectives would appear to continue to be served by a 
decision affirming the constitutionality of the PCAOB. 
B. Scenario 2:  PCAOB Declared Unconstitutional  
 In the second scenario, the Court would declare the PCAOB unconstitutional.  Such a 
decision, simply put, would drastically alter the existing regulatory framework established by 
SOX for the audit profession.  The PCAOB is responsible for both standard-setting and 
enforcement, so the accounting profession would lose both of these important functions should 
the Court strike down the PCAOB.  Beyond this very basic change, overturning the Court of 
Appeals decision would have a number of other significant implications. 
First, there would be vast uncertainty within the business community and accounting 
profession if the PCAOB were struck down.  Foremost, what would happen to the auditing 
                                                
404 Brief for the Center for Audit Quality, supra note 355, at 4-5. 
405 Greg Stohr & Ian Katz, Sarbanes-Oxley May Be Reshaped by U.S. Supreme Court Clash, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
Dec. 4, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=arQ0N_KviWz0. 
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standards-setting and enforcement role that the PCAOB performed?  Cindy Fornelli, Executive 
Director of the Center for Audit Quality, recently opined that the SEC could formally adopt the 
standards promulgated by the PCAOB, which would provide consistency for auditors and public 
companies, but the SEC is not set up to create such standards and is neither equipped nor 
interested in doing so.406  Although the SEC has approved the existing PCAOB auditing 
standards and could adopt these standards as their own should the PCAOB be declared 
unconstitutional, the SEC would likely delegate the responsibility for promulgating future 
auditing standards, such as the Commission has with accounting standards, to FASB.  The 
problem with such an approach, however, is that the delegation to FASB contradicts the original 
purpose of the PCAOB—independence from the profession. 
Second, the elimination of the PCAOB would mean that there would be no rigorous 
inspection process for audit firms.  The SEC itself does not likely have the resources to assume 
the responsibility for inspecting audit firms, and, has been seen, the peer reviews used by the 
profession before the creation of the PCAOB simply did not work. 
Finally, the SEC historically has been under-staffed and over-worked, so, eliminating the 
PCAOB would not be in the long-term best interests of investors. 
 Is a “quick fix” available to make the PCAOB constitutional?  Counsel for the petitioners 
suggests that, no, there is not, given the numerous flaws of the statute.407  Judge Kavanaugh, in 
his dissent in the Court of Appeals decision, however, provides two alternatives to remedy the 
problems of the PCAOB provisions of SOX: 
. . . Congress could easily fix the constitutional flaws by, for example, making 
PCAOB members subject to Presidential appointment with the advice and consent 
of the Senate and therefore removable by the President.  Alternatively, Congress 
could fix the problem by making the PCAOB a truly subordinate part of the SEC 
                                                
406 Interview with Cindy Fornelli, Executive Director, Center for Audit Quality, in Knoxville, TN (Apr. 7, 2010). 
407 Transcript of Oral Argument, at 71-73. 
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– for example, by giving the SEC express authority to direct and supervise all 
Board actions and to fire Board members at will. In such a structure, the Board 
would not differ from any other inferior officers in the SEC. In the meantime, in 
my judgment, the Board’s structure violates the Constitution of the United 
States.408 
 
Although Judge Kavanaugh’s first alternative might well raise issues concerning the 
salary and revenue-raising fee structure of the PCAOB, making PCAOB members 
principal officers would not conflict with the objective of Congress in making the 
PCAOB an independent entity.  The purpose of the PCAOB provisions of SOX was to 
replace self-regulation of the profession with a “‘strong independent accounting oversight 
board’—‘independent,’ that is, from the accounting profession,”409 not independent from 
the President, as had been intent of the independent-counsel statute in Morrison. 
 In the second alternative, while perhaps increasing the SEC’s removal power by 
authorizing the Commission to remove Board members at will, rather than only for cause, 
the proposed change would not restore any Presidential control over the PCAOB, which 
is the Free Enterprise Fund petitioners’ primary objection. 
Even if Congress could perform “statutory surgery”410 to remedy any 
constitutional problems with the PCAOB appointment provisions, such a revision of SOX 
might not just be a simple “quick fix.”  Indeed, some commentators believe that if 
Congress were to revisit SOX, the amendments would not be limited to the PCAOB 
provisions.411  For instance, the SEC has granted smaller companies temporary 
exemptions from the Section 404 requirements through June 15, 2010, but has announced 
                                                
408 PCAOB II, at 715 (citations omitted). 
409 Brief for PCAOB, at 2. 
410 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736. 
411 Stohr, supra note 405.  See Jennifer Levitz, Shielding the Whistleblower, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703939404574568272685253690.html?KEYWORDS=levitz+++w
histleblower (House seeking to amend whistleblower protection created by SOX). 
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that “there will be no further Commission extension.”412  Many have already called for 
this temporary exemption to be made permanent, and the House Financial Services 
Committee has approved a measure to amend SOX accordingly in the interests of smaller 
public companies.413       
 If SOX were to be revisited along the lines suggested by Kavanaugh, there is, of 
course, no assurance that Congress would actually pass such a revised bill.  The political 
and social environment has changed since the Enron/WorldCom era during which the bill 
first passed.  As time has passed, the Enron affair is no longer a pressing issue, though 
reference is often made to the scandal.  Moreover, the current financial crisis has resulted 
in an onslaught of new issues.  Bank failures and the Madoff scandal have led the both 
the public and legislators again to call for reform.  For instance, Congress, led by Senate 
Banking Chairman Christopher Dodd (D-CT), is working on a broad-sweeping financial 
reform bill.414  It should be noted that some commentators believe that legislation, like 
SOX, is not the most efficient means of effecting changes in corporate governance.415 
 As has been discussed, the issue of severability presents a considerable question:  Should 
the Court declare the PCAOB unconstitutional, does the remainder of SOX fall with it?  SOX 
                                                
412 Press Release, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Small Public Companies to Begin Providing Audited 
Assessment of Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting in Nine Months (Oct. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-213.htm. 
413 Fawn Johnson, House Panel OKs Small-Business Exemption on Accounting Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125735033507128259.html?KEYWORDS=SEC+exemption.   
414 See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703465204575208342455198272.html? 
KEYWORDS=bank+bill 
415 “In the aftermath of Enron’s collapse, Congress enacted new rules governing the composition and practices of 
boards [of directors] of all publicly listed companies.  These rules, embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
were designed to strengthen the monitoring and control of public companies by their boards of directors.  Whatever 
the eventual impact of this supposed remedy to Enron-style breakdowns, we need not—and cannot—rely on the 
legislature (or courts) to solve our long-run corporate governance problems.  Indeed, Sarbanes-Oxley arguably has 
made it more difficult to recruit highly experienced executives and other professionals to board [of directors] 
service, by threatening to increase the perils of lawsuits and the risks of damaged reputations.”  SALTER, supra note 
94, at 245.  Salter goes on to suggest that a private-equity model of corporate governance may be most conducive to 
reform. 
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was passed to protect investors and restore confidence in the markets.  Invalidating a significant 
piece of securities legislation like SOX, which was specifically designed by Congress to protect 
investors in response to pressure from the investing public, thus could have a detrimental effect 
on investor confidence and the enforcement of federal securities laws, especially given the worry 
over the current financial crisis.  Independent auditors provide a check, if you will, in the overall 
balance of the business community, and SOX was intended to facilitate and balance that check.    
 Even if SOX remains, though without the PCAOB, a successful constitutional challenge 
to the statute’s PCAOB provisions is very likely to encourage additional challenges—inside and 
outside the courts—to SOX.  Indeed, Congress is already attempting to amend SOX, and further 
legislative proposals to alter the statute in ways that are inconsistent with the original purpose of 
SOX might well be forthcoming.  For instance, the PCAOB has time and again been compared to 
the stock exchanges and self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) currently reporting to the 
SEC.416 The PCAOB contends that the oversight of the SROs is similar to the SEC oversight of 
the PCAOB.  The web of SROs within the securities industry, like the National Association of 
Securities Dealers or New York Stock Exchange, would potentially become a target of 
subsequent constitutional challenges.  
VII. Conclusion 
 The PCAOB is an important organization—for good or bad, the Board affects auditors, 
investors, public companies, and arguably the general public.  The Free Enterprise Fund case is 
a serious challenge to what is, in reality, the cornerstone of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is 
itself a significant piece of reform legislation designed to protect the investing public.  The 
implications of the case could be far-reaching.  Indeed, the auditing profession, the business 
community, constitutional law, independent agencies, the government, and the public interest 
                                                
416 Brief for PCAOB, at 4-5. 
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each has an important stake in the Court’s decision in the case, and each is very likely to be 
affected by that decision.  The legal principles at play in the Free Enterprise Fund case are open 
to interpretation, and the choices that the Court makes in rendering its decision will provide the 
legal framework for investor-protection measures enacted by Congress in the foreseeable future. 
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APPENDIX A–TIMELINE OF SEC CHAIRMEN** 
 
President Chairman    Term 
Roosevelt 
Joseph P. Kennedy (D)  7/2/34 - 9/23/35  
   James M. Landis (D)   9/23/35 - 9/15/37 
William O. Douglas (D)  9/21/37 - 4/16/39  
   Jerome N. Frank (D)   5/18/39 - 4/9/41  
   Edward C. Eicher (D)   4/9/41 - 1/20/42  
   Ganson Purcell (D)   1/20/42 - 6/30/46  
   James J. Caffrey (D)   7/23/46 - 12/31/47  
Truman       
   Edmond M. Hanrahan (D)   5/18/48 - 11/3/49  
   Harry A. McDonald (R)  11/4/49 - 2/25/52  
   Donald C. Cook (D)   2/26/52 - 6/17/53    
Eisenhower  
Ralph H. Demmler (R)  6/17/53 - 5/25/55  
   J. Sinclair Armstrong (R)  5/25/55 - 6/27/57  
   Edward N. Gadsby (R)  8/20/57 - 3/26/61  
Kennedy       
   William L. Cary (D)   3/27/61 - 8/20/64  
   Manuel F. Cohen (D)   8/20/64 - 2/22/69  
Johnson       
    --- 
Nixon  
Hamer H. Budge (R)   2/22/69 - 1/2/71  
William J. Casey (R)   4/14/71 - 2/2/73  
   G. Bradford Cook (R)   3/3/73 - 5/16/73  
   Ray Garrett, Jr. (R)   8/6/73 - 10/28/75 
Ford  
Roderick M. Hills (R)   10/28/75 - 4/10/77  
Carter  
Harold M. Williams (D)  4/18/77 - 3/1/81  
Reagan 
John Shad (R)    5/6/81 - 6/18/87  
   David S. Ruder (R)   8/7/87 - 9/30/89  
G.H.W. Bush 
Richard C. Breeden (R)  10/11/89 - 5/7/93  
Clinton 
Arthur Levitt (D)   7/27/93 - 2/9/01  
G.W. Bush  
Harvey L. Pitt (R)   8/3/01 - 2/17/03 
   William H. Donaldson (R)  2/18/03 - 6/30/05 
   Christopher Cox (R)   8/03/05 - 1/20/09 
Obama  
Mary L. Schapiro (I)   1/27/00 – present 
 
**Adapted from http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm
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